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ABSTRACT 
Most companies base strategies with tespect to competition on product·; innovation, marketing techniques, and portfolio 
management. The manufacturing function is not generally 
considered as·significantly influencing the competitive success 
of the enterprise. 
Recently, a small number of companies have improved their 
competitive position greatly by means of superior manufacturing performance. This thesis examines the concept of manufacturing 
as a source of competitive advantage and develops a framework by 
which firms can maximize the competitive potential of theJ 
manufacturing organization. 
The approach used was to examine both the theoretical basis for 
this concept and to study a number of actual cases of firms that have attempted to develop their manufacturing operation to improve competitive position. 
It demonstrates that manufacturing can become a strong source of 
competitive advantage. Further, the following 'drivers of 
success' were defined: 
!)Business opportunities must be identified 
2)Manufacturing plans must be directed toward realizing 
competitive opportunities. 
C J)Design the product, process, and systems as a single 
entity. 
4)Process simplification and control must precede 
automation. 
5)Employee training and problem solving play a crucial role 
• in program success. 
6)Measurement systems should reflect the success of the firm 
as a whole. Oth~rwise, functional conflicts develop. ?)Improvement must be a continual process if competitive 
advantage is to be maintained. 
These findings are compared with experiences in two active programs at a local manufacturer. A number of recommendations 
are developed to improve the competitive position of the 
organizations. 
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I. FOUNDATION THEORIES 
The concept of Competitive Advantage Through Manufacturing 
Innovation is based upon a large foundation of theoretical and 
applied research. The root of this concept is derived from the 
theories of competition and competitive advantage for the firm as 
a whole. This thesis then studies the role of the manufacturing 
(or operations) segment of the business as a potential source of 
competitive advantage. It then postulates the common 
characteristics which best serve to achieve competitive advantage 
through manufacturing innovation. 
COMPETITION 
? 
Competition is at the core of the success or failure of all 
firms. The competitive environment is the basis for determining 
the appropriateness of a firms activities that contribute to its 
performance. Competitive strategy organizes the search for a 
favorable competitive position in an industry. It aims to 
establish a profitable and sustainable position against the 
':;," 
forces that determine industry position. 
2 
'-' 
According to Porter, (l] the nature and degree of competition in 
I an industry hinge on five forces: the threat of new entrants into 
the market, the bargaining power of customers, the ba~~aining 
power of suppliers, the threat of substitute products, and the 
internal jockeying for position among current competitors. Every 
industry has a unique underlying structure that gives rise to 
these competitive forces. The collective strength of these 
forces determine the ultimate profit potential of an industry. 
The role of top management is to develop and oversee strategies 
that best cope with its industry environment and maximize the 
benefit to the firm at a minimum cost. 
Knowledge of these underlying sources of competitive pressure 
provides for the groundwork for a strategic action plan. These 
sources of competitive pressure highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the company and clarifies areas where strategic 
changes may yield the greatest payoff. Also, they highlight 
places where industry trends promise the greatest opportunities 
or threats. 
1. Competitive Advantage, p. 5. 
3 
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COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
Competitive advantage can not be understood by looking at a firm 
as a whole. It stems from the many discrete activities a firm 
performs in designing, marketing, producing, distributing, and 
supporting its product. Each of these activities can contribute 
to a firm's relative position versus its competitors. Analysis 
of the firm's position in each activities, known as competitive 
benchmarking is a necessary first step toward developing a 
competitive strategy. A similar approach, the 'Business System 
Concept', developed by McKinsey and Company, captures the idea 
that the firm is a series of functions, and by analyzing each 
function relative to competitors can provide useful insights [2]. 
A systematic way of examining all the activities a firm performs 
and how they interact is necessary for analyzing the sources of 
competitive advantage. Porter developed the 'value chain' 
concept as a basic tool for doing so. "The value chain 
disaggregates a firm into its strategically relevant activities 
~ ! in order to understand,the behavior of costs and the existing and 
potential sources of differentiation [ 3] . '' An example of a 
'value chain' is shown in Figure 1. 
2
• The McKinsey Quarterly, Winter 1980; p. 22-23. 
3
• Competitive Advantage; p. 36. 
4 
~~ ---~--~--- ~. --
~-- -----------~-~-------· --~----~ - . --~---- --~-~~~-~---=--~---~~-, 
FIGURE 1 
I HI •M,tN Rf:SOI IR('f~ I R«rui1in1 MANAt;EMf~NT I I rau1in1 
I 
I ("nmpnncnl Machine 
I l~111n l>rsian 
lkse1n I TECHNOLOGY ol I llni1n of 1 cslint Dt:Vt:LOPM[Nf Au1oma1ed As,cmhl) I.int l'roccdurt>s I 
Systtm I i=ncr1y 
I Manaacmenl 
I Ma~rials ()1htr Paris 
t Fnu1y Suppl~s 
Trantporlalion PRO("ltR(M[NT Scrvitn I Elec1rical/ I f lttuuna.: Parh 
I 
I 
lnlk,und ( ·omponrnl 
Material 1-abricalion 
Handlina ASKmbly 
(!'' Inbound f-·inc ·1 unin1 lnspulinn A re,1in1 
Paris Main1cnancr 
Pickin1A 
l>rliwry t-·acililics 
Opcraliun 
INIOIIND tOGISTICS OPERATIONS 
Value Chain for a Copier Manufacturer 
' I I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
•.•• M INt"aAs·ratJ(TUaE 
,· 
Information 
Sy~rm 
IJrwlnpmenl 
Computer 
Services 
l ransporlalinn 
ScrvK.~s 
()rtkr 
Prc1Cr1sin, 
Shippen, 
OIITBOIINI> 
1.o,;1s1·1,·s 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Recruitin1 
Marktl 
Rne1rch 
Sain 
Aids A 
Tn:haical 
l.i~r11urr 
Media 
A,rncy 
Services 
Suppl~s 
f ravcl a 
Subsis1enu 
Adwrtisin1 
Promotion 
Sales force 
MARKt:TINC; 
A SAl.t:S 
Figure 1 reprinted from 11 Competitive Advantage" by Michael Porter. 
0 5 
I 
I Rc&:ru111n, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Service 
Manuals 
I and Prck:cdurrs 
I 
I 
Spare Pauls 
I ravel a 
Su1Ki,1cncc 
Servacc Reps 
Spare P.aras 
Systems 
,. 
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY 
Once the corporate strategist has assessed the forces affecting 
the competition in the industry, he can identify his company's 
strengths and weaknesses. The strategist can then develop a plan 
that positions the company so that its capabilities provide the 
best defenseJagainst the competitive forces or the best 
opportunity to alter the competitive balance and gain strategic 
advantage. Porter defines competitive advantage as "An 
integrated set of policies in each functional area of the firm 
that aims to create a sustainable advantage [ 4] . '' 
Competitive strategy can lead to two broad types of competitive 
advantage, lower cost and differentiation. These two broad types 
of competitive. advantage can be achieved by three generic 
competitive strategies: overall cost leadership (industry-wide), 
overall differentiation, and focus on·a narrow business segment 
(niche). The focus strategy seeks to exploit the inability of 
broadly based companies to address all business segments equally 
well. The choice of a particular generic strategy refers to the 
choice of competitive advantage sought by the ffrm and does not 
imply that the firm can ignore other aspects of its business. 
4
• Research on Technological Innovation, Management, and Policy, Vol. l; p. 217. 
6 
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There are many ways to implement each of the three generic 
strategies. The particular functional policies that support each 
of the three differ by industry because of· the uniqueness of each 
industry structure. Structure also determines whether each of 
the three strategies is attainable and defensible. If a firm can 
apply a strategy to attain a competitive advantage and protect 
the sources of this advantage from the five competitive forces, 
it will be able to earn above average returns for its industry. 
Usually, firms can not achieve both lower cost and 
differentiation because they imply different policies, 
strategies, and organizations. In some situations, the two are 
not inconsistent and the benefits to the firm are additive. 
It is both difficult and dangerous for a company to try to 
compete by offering superior performance along several 
competitive dimensions. A firm that engages in each generic 
strategy but fails to achieve any of them is 'stuck in the 
middle'. The firm then possesses no competitive advantage which 
usually results in below average performance. 
SUSTAINABLE ADVANTAGE 
Many strategies are very effective in creating a competitive 
advantage. However, most of these strategies can be rapidly 
7 
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imitated or even improved upon by competitors. Relatively few 
strategic advantages can be sust¥ned over long periods of time. 
Product innovations, new processes, and marketing advantages are 
often offset within one year of introduction. Patents usually 
fail to deter imitation. Product imitations cost a third less 
.. 
than innovation and are a third quicker to introduce (5]. New 
processes are even harder to protect than new products. 
Marketing tools, particularly price changes are very easily 
countered. 
Ghemawat identifies three very successful sources of sustainable 
advantage: 
(1) Size in the targeted market, 
(2) Superior access to resourcep or customers, 
(3) Restrictions on competitors options. 
These advantages are nonexclusive; the more of them, the better. 
Market share advantage not only results in economies of scale, 
but impacts access to funds, experience levels, and scope 
economies. These advantages are very difficult to offset. 
Access advantage is sustainable if two conditions are met. 
First, inputs and markets are secured u·nder better terms~ than 
competitors will be able to get later; and second, the advantage 
has to be enforceable in th~ long run.- Restrictions on 
competitors option~ is often the most powerful source of 
5 
• J.ournal of Industrial Economics, Dec. 19 8 5 ; p. 21 7 • 
8~ 
competitive advantage. These restrictions may result from 
government policy, such as patents, antitrust laws, and utility 
status. A business can also sustain an advantage if competitors 
are restricted by past investments or long response times. 
Not all industries offer equal opportunities to sustain an 
advantage. Industries that evolve gradually offer more room to 
sustain advantages than those that are regularly rocked by 
drastic changes in technology or demand. 
Ghemawat summarized his findings by the following comments: 
''To create a sustainable advantage, you must either be blessed with competitors that have a restricted menu of 
options or be able to preempt them •.•• Ultimately, the 
search for sustainability involves a series of decisions 
about the degree to which you are willing to commit your 
business to a particular way of doing things. You have to 
pick the relative emphasis you are going to place on two 
things: commitment to competing a particular way and 
retaining the flexibility to compete effectively in other 
ways [ 6]. '' 
( 
OUTPACING STRATEGIES 
We have identified that over t~me a particular strategy often 
loses its competitive impact. Gilbert and Strebel [7] propose a 
cyclical strategy which alternates between cost leadership and 
6
• Harvard Business Review, Sept.-Oct._1986, p.53-58. 
7
• The Journal of Business strategy, summer 1987; p. 28-36. 
9 
-~- - -=-· - ---------------~---- ----~~--,-~------- ---,,-. ·-·· 
~--------- - --- -----~--------- -~-- --------- --- --~-~-- --~--~-- -- -
product differentiation to 'outpace the competition'. The 
proposition is based on their findings that opportunities for 
strategic leverage of perceived product value vary significantly 
over the course of an industry's or product's evolution. They 
compare two alternate approaches, shown in Figure 2, 
standardization and rejuvenation. 
Standardization, common in Western companies, seeks to first 
maximize the perceived product value and then to minimize cost. 
Two well known examples of standardization are the Ford Model T 
and the IBM Personal Computer family. The rejuvenation strategy, 
popular with Japanese companies, first develops the capability to 
produce the product at the lowest cost and then to add more 
features and value to the product to move from low-priced market 
segments to higher-priced segments. This strategy has been 
extremely successful for many Japanese automotive and consumer 
electronics companies. 
The successful application of outpacing strategies require a keen 
percepti.on of when the product and market will be re~dy for this 
\ 
shift. Outpacing also requires corresponding shifts in the 
company's external market focus and internal organization focus. 
The shift from innovat.ion to standardization requires concessions 
of product variety by marketing and R&D. It also can require 
major organizational changes from an entrepreneurial environment 
10 
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FIGURE 2 
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Figure 2 rep.rinted from "Strategies to Outpace the Competition" by 
Gilbert & Strebel 
" 
l l 
; 
• 
to a steady business focus. Apple Computer is a recent case of a 
company making this standardization transition. 
The work of Gilbert and Strebel demonstrates that even the most 
successful strategies must eventually be adapted or replaced in 
I 
order to continue to sustain a competitive advantage. The 
cyclical 'outpacing strategies' are a powerful approach for 
developing and sustaining a competitive advantage. 
STRATEGIC BUSINESS PLAN 
The strategic business plan (SBP) has become the key planning 
tool which directs most industrial companies. The SBP contains 
the firm's overall strategic objectives and the plans developed 
to achieve these objectives. It identifies the firm's industry 
position and the changes needed to outperform the competition. 
It defines the inputs from each business unit and function.~ and 
the outputs necessary to achieve the corporate objectives • 
12 
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FUNCTIONAL STRATEGIES 
Once the firm has established an overall business strategy it 
must translate the SBP objectives to specific plans for each 
business function. The key functional strategies for most 
industrial companies are: marketing, research & development 
(R&D), manufacturing, and distribution. Traditionally the 
marketing and R&D plans were the key ingredients to the firm's 
competitive strategies. Manufacturing and distribution were 
viewed as having little impact on the firm's ultimate success in 
the marketplace. We define manufacturing in its broadest context 
,, 
as all actions necessary to convert raw materials to products 
which satisfy the customers needs. It includes the functions of: 
production, product and manufacturing engineering, production and 
inventory control, purchasing, quality assurance, and 
manufacturing management. This function is also commonly 
referred to as operations. 
These perceptions are rapidly changing due to the recent market 
successes of many foreign and domestic firms who have used their 
manufacturing (and to a lesser extent distribution) resources as 
•' 
a strong competitive weapon. For example, the Japanese 
automakers have built upon a manufacturing cost advantage and 
' 
their reputation as the highest quality producers to gain 
significant worldwide market share and profits. The're are many 
13 
) 
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other recent examples of firms using manufacturing superiority as 
a strong competitive weapon. 
Manufacturing Strategy 
Manufacturing strategy begins with a mission and set of 
objectives linked to attaining the firm's SBP. An excellent 
example is the mission statement of Allen-Bradley Company's 
Industrial Controls Group (studied in depth in Section II). 
''The mission of manufacturing is to provide the necessary 
manufacturing and/or sourcing capabilities required to meet 
the objectives of the business and achieve a position as a 
world-class supplier [8]." 
The manufacturing strategy seeks to identify the actions 
necessary to achieve the manufacturing mission. It involves 
decisions related to: capacity, facilities, equipment and process 
technologies, degree of vertical integration, sourcing, quality, 
systems, products, and human resources. These decisions control 
' 
the manufacturing 'drivers of success': product cost, quality, 
and customer service. 
8
• Manufacturing Engineering, November 1987; p. 46. 
14 
The plans to implement the manufacturing strategy include not 
• 
only internal manufacturing actions but also joint efforts with 
R&D, marketing, and distribution. Manufacturing interface with 
R&D is necessary to assure that products and processes are 
designed to achieve the desired cost, quality, and service 
levels. The interaction with marketing and distribution is to 
'close the loop between customer needs and manufacturing output. 
MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A MANUFACTURING OPERATION 
The ultimate effectiveness of a manufacturing operation is its 
ability to achieve the objectives of the mission statement listed 
above. That is, to perform its function in such a way as to give 
the firm a competitive edge. 
Hayes and Wheelwright (9] developed a framework which identifies 
four possible roles that the manufacturing function can play in 
the firm. These roles can be viewed as stages of development 
along a continuum. At one extreme, manufacturing can offer 
little contribution to the company's market success; at the 
other, it provides a major source of competitive advantage. They 
define the four stages as follows: 
9
• Restoring Our Competitive Edge, John Wiley, 1~84. 
15 
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Stage 1 - Internally Neutral Manufacturing seeks to minimize the function's negative potential • 
. 
Stage 2 - Externally Neutral 
Manufacturing achieves parity with its competitors. 
Stage 3 - Internally Supportive Manufacturing provides credible support to the business strategy. 
Stage 4 - Externally Supportive The firm achieves and sustains a manufacturing-based competitive advantage. 
According to Hayes & Wheelwright, the vast majority of American 
firms are positioned in Stages 1 and 2. Recently there has been 
a push by many firms to Stage 3; only a handful of companies are 
judged to be at Stage 4. 
The stages are not mutually exclusive. A given manufacturing 
operation may be composed of factors that are themselves at 
different levels of development. The overall level for tl1e 
operation is where the balance among these factors falls. 
The stage of manufacturing competitiveness for an operation is~ 
dynamic. Without continual improvement, the operation will be 
passed by competition and will fall to a lower level. Most firms 
are content with the·ir stage until external pressures force a 
move. Transition to a higher level be.gins when managers come to 
doubt the effectiveness of their traditional approaches or are 
concerned- that competitors owe some of their success to their 
manufacturing process technologies. 
, I 
! 'i I • 16 
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During the early 1980s each of these pressures became more 
prevalent and hundreds of firms shifted toward Stage 3. In many 
indust~ies, the sudden appearance of foreign competition and 
global markets jolted stagnant American firms into action. Hayes 
and Wheelwright foresee that once the crisis is over, many of 
these companies will be unable to sustain that level and revert 
to 'business as usual' and Stage 2. 
The transition to a higher level of competitive effectiveness 
requires a transformation in management's attitude and approach 
to manufacturing. The transition to Stage 4 is particularly 
difficult.because it requires major organizational changes and 
significant attention and commitment by top management. In Stage 
4 manufacturing is no longer a reactive function but is an equal 
partner with marketing and R&D as a source of competitive 
advantage. Few companies recognize the potential benefits of 
Stage 4, and as a result managers are unwilling to make the 
necessary commitment. 
Hayes and Wheelwright use four variables to determine a firm's 
(or business unit's) placement in Stage 3 or 4. The variables 
are: 
1) the amount of in-house innovation, 
2) the extent to which a company develops its own 
manufacturing equipment, 
17 
3) the attention paid to manufacturing infrastructure, and 
4) the link between product design and process design • 
. Only if the company (or business unit) displays· stren.gth in each 
of these areas is it likely that manufacturing can be a 
significant source of strategic advantage. 
OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS 
American manufacturing firms face many common. obstacles, both 
internal and external, when seeking to achieve a competitive 
advantage in our global marketplace. The few domestic firms 
which are recognized as demonstrating 'World-Class Manufacturing' 
have successfully overcome these .. obstacles in a variety of ways • 
. 
Three of these firms will be studied in Section II. 
Internal factors which limit competitiveness are well documented. 
They include: labor costs among the highest in the world, equally 
high overhead costs, inefficient manufacturing processes, poor 
product quality, long manufacturing lead times, and long 
setup/changeover times. Other factors are: a limited pool of 
skilled labor, insufficient internal training (both professional 
and production workers), an adversarial relationship between 
management and labor, poor internal communication of needs and 
18 ( 
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priorities, and unfocused plants which produce dissimilar 
products or processes with a single approach. 
Competitiveness is also limited by factors external to 
,, 
manufacturing such as: inattention by top management to 
manufacturing needs and potential as a competitive force, 
insufficient manufacturing development capabilities, limited 
consideration of manufacturability issues by product designers, 
poor communication of customer requirements (both quantity and 
attributes) to manufacturing, ineffective supplier base (quality, 
delivery, and cost), and conflicting priorities and allegiances 
' 
of the marketing, development, and manufacturing organizations. 
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS 
This topic has generated a great deal of attention in business 
and engineering literature. It has been spurned by the apparent 
downfall of America as the leader in production of many 
industrial and commercial goods. The American shipbuilding, 
steel, automotive, consumer electronics, and textile industries 
have suffered great losses due to foreign competitors with 
superior manufacturing capabilities. The following section 
reviews some of the most promising approaches whic~ have been 
developed to improve manufacturing competitiveness. :::, ,I 
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concentration will be on technologically complex products 
requiring substantial R&D and manufacturing process expertise. 
Also, concentration will be on industries involved in batch 
production rather than continuous processes. 
Just-In-Time Manufacturing (JIT) And Total Quality Control (TQC) 
These concepts are well documented in technical literature (Hall, 
1983; Goddard, 1987; Monden, 1983; Schonberger, 1982 & 1986; 
Shingo, 1986; etc.) and will not be detailed here. JIT and TQC 
have a great deal in common: they have greatly improved the 
competitive position of many firms, they require a minimal 
capital investment, they first became popular with Japanese 
manufacturers, and they concentrate on solving people-related 
problems more than technological problems. Both JIT and TQC seek 
to eliminate all waste in the manufacturing operation, including: 
excess inventory, scrap, rework, excess space, design or process 
complexity, long changeover times, or extra layers of staff. 
Similar concepts include: value-added manufacturing, frugal 
. " 
. manufacturing, and the Toyota Production System. 
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Though JIT and TQC are two distinct concepts, they are commonly 
implemented in tandem. Schonberger (and others) contends that 
the full benefit of each can not be realized without the other 
(10]. 
i 
Much of the recent success of the Japanese automakers and·-/· 
" 
electronics companies, as well as a few le.ading-edge American 
firms has been attributed to the tremendous resurgence in 
manufacturing through successful JIT and TQC programs. These 
concepts will be studied in much greater depth in Section II. 
Focused Factories 
Most Ameriqan factories produce many products for numerous 
customers in a variety of markets. They are often a hodgepodge 
of many diverse manufacturing processes, production volumes, and 
# 
personnel requirements - jumbled under. one roof. In the mid-
1970s Skinner_proposed the concept of the Focused Factory (11]. 
This approach to manufacturing received little attention outside 
of academic circles until the productivity crisis.of the early 
1980s. Since that t.ime, Skinner has gr·eatly expanded his work 
10. World Class Manufacturing, p. 225. 
ll. Harvard Business Review, May-June 1974; p.113-121. 
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[12] and a number of firms have had great success as a result of 
developing focused factories. Other authors refer to terms such 
as 'Strategic Manufacturing Unit' (SMU) to describe focused 
. . 
factories [13]. 
Skinner points to three basic concepts underlying focused 
manufacturing: 
1) there are many ways to compete besides by producing at 
the lowest cost, 
2) a factory can not perform well on every measurement (cost, quality, volume flexibility, rapid response to 
customer requirements, new product innovations, etc.), and 
3) simplicity and repetition breed competence. 
Within the factory, the manufacturing function can be a 
competitive weapon by outstanding accomplishment of one or more 
measures of manufacturing performance, so long as this excellence 
meets the needs of the target market. 
Skinner lists the key characteristics of the focused factory as: 
1).. Limited process technologies (typically no more than 
three or four), 
2) Market demands (such as price, lead time, quality, etc.): Usually a plant can not do a superb job on more than two demands at a given period of time. 
12
• Manufacturing: The Formidable Competitive Weapon; 1985. 
13
• The Journal of Business Strategy, Fall 1987; p. 24. 
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3) Product volumes: generally these are at a comparable 
· level. · · 
4) Quality levels: A common attitude is maintained for all 
elements: tooling, equipment, inspection, training, etc. 
' In general, more variety in one characteristic can be tolerated 
if the other characteristics are relatively stable. Conversely, 
the greater the number of variable characteristics, the poorer 
the performance. 
The focused factory approach is being practiced in two distinct 
ways. The first is to limit the scope of the factory as 
described above. The second, known as the 'plant within a plant' 
(PWP), -is where a facility is divided both organizationally and 
physically into nearly independent segments. This division could 
be based on any of the above characteristics, but are most 
commonly focused by product or volume level. Often JIT 
operations are product-focused PWPs. 
. . 
The focused factory approach offers firms the opportunity to 
develop their manufacturing operation as a competitive weapon, 
particularly when competing with general~purpose, do-it-all 
plants which satisfy no strategy, no market, and no specific 
task. 
23 
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Flexible Manufacturing/ Economies of Scope 
• The recent advent of advanced computer technology to 
manufacturing has expanded the opportunities for firms to use 
flexible manufacturing as a means to attain competitive 
t 
advantage. Flexible manufacturing typically refers to a means 
where a large variety of products can be economically 
manufactured in small lot quantities. Flexible manufacturing 
approaches include: flexible manufacturing systems (FMS), 
manufacturing cells, and flexible workstations. 
FMSs are an integrated group of workstations with automated 
material handling. Figure 3 shows a typical FMS. The entire 
system is controlled by a central computer or computer network. 
FMSs provide flexible manufacturing capability with a high degree 
of automation and very minimal labor requirements. The systems 
are very expensive to design, purchase, and maintain: they 
require an investment of millions of dollars. FMSs were once 
limited to machining processes but now encompassing such 
. processes. as: metal fabrication, mechanical and electronics 
. 
assembly, and even integrated manufacturing (fabrication, 
assembly, test, and packaging). 
Flexible ~orkstations and manufacturing cells offer many of the 
benefits of FMSs without as large ~·capital outlay. Flexible 
workstations may or may not be highly automated. Their common 
24 
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FIGURE 3 
-
Flexible Manufacturing System With On Line, lnspect~on 
DATE INSTALLED: 1981 
SYSTEM COMPONENTS: 
PHASE 1 
9 MILWAUKEE-MATIC 600'1 
1 CORDAX INSPECTION sT,.TtON 
TOWLINE MATERIAL HANDLING SYSTEM 
CENTRAL COMPUTER 
PHASE 2 
2 MILWAUKEE-MATIC 600'1 
OVERALL SYSTEM SIZE 
122' 
92' SYSTEM 
MANAGERS 
OFFICE 
LOAD/UNLOAD AREAS 
Figure 3 reprinted from 11 Manufacturing Systems Application Workbook11 by Kearney & Trecker Corp. 
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attribute is the capability to economically produce a wide range 
of products. Flexible workstations often accomplish this by 
rapid changeovers between dissimilar products. Manufacturing 
cells contain a number of workstations which together produce a 
'family' of products. Figure 4 shows a typical manufacturing 
? 
cell. They differ from FMSs in that cells generally do not have 
automated material handling and overall computer control. Thus, 
manufacturing cells are more labor-intensive but much less costly 
to develop and maintain. 
Flexible automation offers a compromise between fixed automation 
and manual labor. It offers greater productivity and reliability 
than manual labor without as great a loss in flexibility as fixed 
automation. Flexible automation generally does not offer the 
production output of fixed automation. Flexible automation is 
particularly suited for operations with small to medium 
quantities. 
Flexible automation now gives manufacturing the capability to 
produce a wide product variety and adapt to frequent design 
innovations, with comparable quality and production rates 
approaching those of fixed automation. This capability is 
dependant on a very close relationship between product designers 
a-nd manufacturing engineering. The flexible automation limits 
the variability of the product design. Products can vary in 
26 
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FIGURE 4 \ \ 
Multi-Station Manufacturing Cell DATE INSTALLED: 1976 
0 
0 
D 0 D 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
oo 
CELL COMPONENTS: 
4 MODU-LINES 
1 TRAVELING COLUMN MODU-LINES 
2 SPECIAL BORING MODULES 
\ 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
oo 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0, 0 
0 0 
oo 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
oo 
SPECIAL NOTE: 
MACHINE ARRANGEMENT AND SHUTTLE SYSTEM 
IS DESIGNED TO READILY ACCEPT 
A MATERIAL HANDLING SYSTEM. 
Figure 4 reprinted from "Manufacturing Systems Application Workbook 11 by Kearney & Trecker Corp. 
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certain characteristics but are limited in others due to tooling 
constraints. 
·1 
Flexible manufacturing challenges current assumptions about 
manufacturing based upon 'economies of scale', the economic 
advantage most manufacturing systems derive from large production 
levels. Fixed automation often is most efficient with lot sizes 
in the thousands. Flexible manufacturing systems can 
economically produce much smaller batches, some approaching the 
If 
ultimate economic lot quantity - one unit. 
By reducing the significance of economies of scale, flexible 
manufacturing methods can take advantage of 'economies of scope' 
as a source of competitive advantage. "Economies of scope exist 
where the same equipment can produce multiple products more 
cheaply in1 combination than separately [14]." For example, a 
computer-controlled flexible manufacturing workstation may be 
. 
able to produce a dozen different parts in succession just as 
economically as an equal number of identical parts. This is 
possible because changeover times (and costs) are negligible if 
the only changeover ~sin the computer software. 
,.,m 
Today's computer-based flexible manufacturing technology reverses 
the historical trend toward specialized hardware by placing 
emphasis on specialized software instead. Matching general-
., 
~.~~-- --~- ------- --- - ---- - -~~----- ---~~ 
14. Harvard Business Review, November-December 1983, p. 143. 
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purpose machines with special-purpose programming moves the work 
of batch production toward the smooth flow of continuous process 
operations. Equally important, the flexibility of such matching 
opens up new markets, customers, and channels of distribution, 
and along with them, new routes to competitive advantage. 
Integrating these new.capabilities - these economies of scope -
into business strategy will offer a company huge advantages in 
the worldwide marketplace for increasingly customized products. 
Forging the necessary organizational linkages and administrative 
support systems will not be easy. But as a company's distinctive 
competence comes increasingly to rest on manufacturing systems 
and not just on.given product designs or market dominance, this 
change in thinking becomes essential. 
' Computer-Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) 
CIM is, in concept, the ultimate approach to improving 
' 
manufacturing competitiveness. It builds on the concepts of JIT, 
TQC, Focused Factories, and Flexible Manufacturing. It also 
. 
stretches beyond the scope of manufacturing to include the 
linkages with product design, marketing, distribution, and 
finance. CIM in essence, utilizes computer systems to integrate 
the entire business into a highly efficient, flexible 
29 
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organization designed to meet the needs of the marketplace. CIM 
is not yet a reality, but there are many examples of firms who 
are rapidly moving toward this goal. 
What will it be like to live in CIM? Hulas H. King, manager of 
manufacturing systems engineering for McDonnell Aircraft Co., 
describes his vision: 
''Design functions will be handled in a paperless environment 
with the blueprint becoming obsolete. The geometric and 
nonshape digital data from the design model will provide a 
means to drive downstream operations such as tooling, 
planning, numerical-control machines, and robots. 
Inforin~tion-management systems will provide the data to 
support day-to-day activities_such as: material handling, 
production scheduling, manpower allocations, and cost 
charging. Computer-based tools will replace the physical 
hard tooling and master models. Cellular manufacturing will be prevalent throughout the production shop. Materials, 
tools, and work-in-process will arrive at the work cell in a just-in-time basis [ 15]. '' 
In addition, the CIM system should be able to quickly adapt to 
changes in product design and production volume. In order to 
accomplish this, an integration between design and manufacturing 
will be necessary. 
Firms which can accomplish these objectives in an economical 
manner and be able to harness these resources to meet the market 
needs will have a tremendous competitive advantage. 
15. Industry Week, February 9, 1987; p. 47. 
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' There are still many technological obstacles to be overcome 
. 
before this vision becomes a reality. However, the greatest 
challenge to the firm seeking these objectives is not 
technological. The firms greatest challenge is to design the 
system-and redesign the entire organization to a form which will 
satisfy their particular needs. Further, the· structure must be 
flexible enough to adapt to an ever-changing marketplace. 
Design For Manufacturability/ Simultaneous Engineering· 
Each of the-approaches to improve manufacturing competitiveness 
. discussed above puts a great responsibility on the product and 
process design engineers. JIT and TQC require product designs 
which can be manufactured consistently without defect. The 
manufacturing process must also run efficiently without, recurring 
problems. The effective focused factory requires commonality 
among products and process. Flexible manufacturing is dependent 
on coordination between product and manufacturing engineers to 
develop products which can be produced efficiently given the 
constraints of the manufacturing system. It/·a1so requires 
foresight on the part of the engineers to design a manufacturing 
system which is flexible in the necessary parameters. CIM 
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carries this linkage further to require that new product and 
process design be 'transparent' when reaching the production 
process. Clearly, for manufacturing to be a source of 
competitive advantage to the firm, products must be designed for 
. 
efficient manufacture and the manufacturing processes must be 
extremely reliable and flexible to the extent required by the 
product design. 
. Simultaneous engineering is another methodology involving 
engineering and manufacturing which offers tremendous potential 
for competitive advantage. This approach to new product and 
process development is capable of greatly reducing the time 
required to successfully bring a product to market. This 
capability allows the firm to introduce products which address 
new market needs well ahead of the competition .. This early entry 
. 
into new markets is critical for long term success in many 
industries. A number of firms which are now using the 
simultaneous engineering approach not only report a significant 
reduction in development time but also a corresponding reduction 
in cost. 
Today, most products are developed in a sequential manner. 
Another name for it is the NASA 'Phased Program Planning' (PPP) 
. 
-
system. Here, a concept is developed, the product is designed, 
then the process is developed, and finally the product is 
released for production. The only overlap between functions is 
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when the design is ''handed off'' from one phase to the next. This 
is neat step-by-step approach, and as a result it is easily 
managed. 
However, the sequential approach is very time consuming because 
each downstream function must wait for the preceding step to be 
completed. Then, they must fit this project i~to their schedule 
and budget. Another weakness of this approach is that downstream 
problems are not identified until the transfer point or later. 
This results in either delays for redesign or the downstream 
function working around the problem. Delayed product 
introductions, quality problems, cost overruns, and engineering 
changes often result. Finally, organizational learning does not 
occur because problems are not usually filtered back to the 
source. 
• 
Simultaneous engineering - and, .similar ·concepts such as: 
integrated engineering (Putnam [16]), holistic-rugby approach \ 
(Takeuchi & Nonaka (17]), and overlapping pro~lem solving (Clark 
& Fujimoto [18]) - are based on a parallel, rather than 
sequential development process. The primary variable which 
differentiates these propositions is the degree of overlap. Both 
1987. 
16
• Harvard Business Review, May-June 1985; p. 139-144. 
17 • Harvard Business Review, Jan.-Feb. 1986; p. 137-146. 
l8. ''Overlapping Problem Solving in Product Development'', 
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Clark and Putnam concentrate on the overlap between adjacent 
phases as a key to reducing the development cycle. Takeuchi & 
Nonaka and Hayes & Wheelwright [19] refer to cases where firms 
have overlapp~d multiple phases. 
simultaneous engineering refers to this multiple overlap approach 
to development where the manufacturing tooling and processes are 
being developed long before the product design is complete. 
Clearly, this approach,offers a great advantage in 
reduced development time, but is not without problems. First and 
most importantly, communication and coordination between 
functions is critical to the success of the effort. Without this 
interaction and strong program management, the various segments 
will not be compatible and the gain in speed will be lost during 
the redesign and debugging process. Also, the individual 
engineering functions must share responsibility for the whole 
process, not just their own piece. Product and process designers. 
must work together to design the product and process jointly. 
Product designers must be concerned about manufacturability 
issues.and manufacturing engineers must learn to deal with an 
imprecise, changing product. 
f/ 
' The obstacles to improving the manufacturability significantly 
and reducing the development time and cost of new products are 
19
• Restoring our Competitive Edge: Competing Through Manufacturtng; 1984. 
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great. However, there have already been a number of documented 
examples (by the authors listed above) where firms have overcome 
these barriers to gain a major competitive advantage in their 
markets. 
I , 
Summary 
-
The approaches discussed in this section all offer great promise 
to achieve a manufacturing-based competitive advantage. None are 
applicable to all firms and all industries. However, these 
concepts, individually and jointly, are the basis for the past 
0 
success and future pl~ns of many firms recognized as 'World-
Class Manufacturers'. The next section presents case studies of 
foUr firms which have sought to attain competitive advantage 
through manufacturing innovation • 
• 
35 
II. INDUSTRY CASES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH 
MANUFACTURING INNOVATION 
This, section builds upon the concepts developed in the first 
section by use of actual industry case studies. These cases 
demonstrate companies who have tried to develop a competitive 
advantage through manufacturing innovation. Many of the 
. 
' 
companies have been successful; some have not. It proposes 
possible reasons for their success or failure. This evidence 
supports the propositions in the first section and suggests 
possible strategies to aid other firms. 
The section is comprised of four cases from American industry: 
the General Motors Corporation Hamtramck, NUMMI, and Saturn 
programs; The General Electric Company Major Appliance Business 
Group's dishwasher and refrigeration products revitalization; 
Allen-Bradley Company Industrial Control Division's IEC Contactor 
product and FMS facility in Milwaukee, WI; and Hewlett-Packard 
Company's Just-In-Time Manufacturing and Total Quality Control 
programs at their Ft. Collins, CO; Sunnyvale and San Diego, CA 
sites. 
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GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION (GM) 
Introduction 
This case examines General Motors' efforts to improve their 
competitiveness through the introduction of new technologies, new 
plants, and new car designs since 1980. These efforts have 
proven mostly unsuccessful to date. The case analyzes the errors 
GM made, the lessons they learned, and their resulting 
adjustments to future program~ such as Project Saturn. 
The study demonstrates that achievement of competitive advantage 
through the application of advanced manufacturing technologies 
requires corresponding changes to the way the company is 
organized and managed. 
Background 
Automobile manufacturing is the world's largest industry; some 75 
automakers now produce over 45 million vehicles each year. Total 
sales reached $384 billion in 1986, 2.1% of the world's gross 
product (equivalent to GNP). Recently, growth has slowed to 1-2% 
per year and the industry has become very compet_i ti ve. 
37 
The surge in competitiveness results primarily from the 
increasing global scope of the industry. The five largest 
automakers - General Motors, Ford, Toyota, Volkswagen, and Nissan 
- all manufacture and distribute vehicles on at least four 
continents. These top five companies now produce more than half 
of the worlds automobiles. 
The leading Japanese car makers are now building North American 
capacity to produce over 2.5 million automobiles in ten plants by 
1990. This production e~pansion is creating massive world-wide 
excess capacity, expected to reach 6 million units by 1990. A 
recent FORTUNE article states: 
''The new internationalism has created a golden age for car buyers everywhere. As they shop the world, they are de~anding and getting even better design, performance, and 
comfort. The most successful manufacturers today build cars 
with Japanese quality and European-style handling that 
coddle their passengers in the mass-market opulence America pioneered [ 2 o] • 11 
With the heavy emphasis on fuel economy and emission controls ,, 
·" . .;:.,... 
behind them, automakers are delivering advances in technology 
that enhance drivability, handling, performance, safety, and even 
more fuel economy. Consumer demand is extremely volatile and the 
primary sources of volatility are out of the automakers control, 
such as: oil prices, interest rates, government regulations, and 
international exchange rates. The successful automaker must not-
only produce high quality vehicles at competitive prices; 
20. FORTUNE, Nov. 9, 1987; p.74. 
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must predict the future levels of these exogenous variables and 
design their product, process, and manufacturing strategy around 
that forecast. The successful automaker must also react to 
unplanned demand levels with rapid capacity or model changes and 
marketing adjustments. 
GENERAL MOTORS CORP. 
In 1979, General Motors had just completed their most successful 
year in company history. The company earned a record $3.5 
billion on.$63 billion in sales. Early in the year, GM unveiled 
one of the most ambitious business strategies ever proposed. 
Over the next seven year~~ GM would use its financial strength 
00 
and technical knowhow to redesign every·one of its cars and 
' factories. The cost: $40 billion, enough to bQy both Toyota and 
Nissan outright-at the time. 
''As conceiveg, the factories would spew out an armada of 
fuel-saving, smaller cars with front-wheel drive and quality 
to rival the world's best. High tech and high volume would 
enable GM to make cars more cheaply than anyone. In one 
master-stroke, GM would stop the import invasion cold and 
leave Ford and Chrysler clunking along, years be~ind [21]. '' 
The plan didn't work. Eight ye~rs and some $60 billion later, 
Ford and Chrysler are not the ones in trouble; GM is. The 
21. Business Week, March 16, 1987; p.103. 
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company that was once the leader in mass production and mass 
marketing now has the highest costs of the Big Three. Many of 
its expensive pew high-tech plants are barely more efficient than 
the old ones. Its cars are considered~second rate in quality, 
performance, and innovative features. In 1986, GM's domestic 
market share.dropped to 37%, well below the 48% of 1978. worse, 
despite over 5Q% more sales, its profits fell below Ford for the 
first time in over 50 years. 
What went wrong? In retrospect, three key factors stand out. 
This study will review these factors and then detail the lessons 
GM learned from two specific cases, the new Detroit-Hamtramck 
assembly plant and its New United. Motors Manufacturing, ,Inc . 
. (NUMMI) partnership with Toyota. The study will then consider 
how GM might apply these lessons to GM's future plans, 
specifically its Saturn Corp. subsidiary. 
First, GM's ne~ products did not match the market needs. 
Expecting rising gasoline prices, the company invested in smaller 
cars. Instead, lower gas prices caused a surge in demand for 
larger automobiles. GM was unable to adapt its product designs 
and factory investments rapidly enough to meet the changing 
market. This left the company with wasted investments in excess 
·-v!) 
small car capacity and no strong products to meet the new market 
requirements. Also, GM sought to achieve greater economies of 
scale by developing new models with very similar designs. This 
40 
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') 
backfired as consumers could not perceive a significant 
! 
difference between models. Its large cars\looked like its small 
I 
i 
cars, and its 'economy' Chevrolets and Pon~iacs looked much like 
) 
,, 
'luxury' Buicks, Oldsmobiles, and Cadillacs'-. These new designs 
destroyed the identity of each line and greatly reduced sales in 
\ 
the booming market for high price, high profit luxury cars. 
Second, GM believed that if it invested heavily in factory 
automation such as robotics and computerized control systems, 
increased efficiency would be assured. It found out the hard way 
that most new te~hnology only pays off when coupled with changes 
in the way work is organized on the factory floor. Many of the 
problem areas GM sought t~ improve by automation resulted in 
automated problems. Also, much of the labor cost savings from 
' ' 
the automation went to pay generous unemployment and retraining 
benefits to displaced workers. • 
Third, GM's enormous size and vertical integration became a 
hinderance rather than a help. GM makes about 70% of the parts 
used in its cars - in high cost, unionized plants with poor 
productivity. GM's competitors can buy parts from suppliers at 
' 
lower costs and often with higher quality. The company's quality 
reputation was further damaged by a series of well publicized 
recalls to correct design flaws. 
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While GM was struggling, Ford and Chrysler were slashing costs 
• 
and improving their cars. Ford's rapidly growing luxury car 
• 
sales resulted in a tremendous increase in profits, at the 
expense of GM. General Moto~s was left as the highest cost 
automaker despite its~massive investment in new technologies, new 
plants, and new car designs. 
' 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Detroit-Hamtramck (D-H) 
General Motors' new ultra-modern Detroit-Hamtramck assembly plant 
opened in the fall of 1985. The plant, which makes the all-new 
Buick Riviera, Oldsmobile Toronado, Cadillac Seville and Allante 
has experienced a series of major problems since its opening. 
After the first nine months in operation, D-H was only producing 
40 cars per hour, well below the planned 60 car per hour rate. 
This example demonstrates many of the errors in GM's business 
strategy based upon applying manufacturing automation as means to 
achieve competitive a~vantage. 
GM officials admit that the problems at the plant have resulted 
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\ 
. from a combination of a new facility, new product, and advanced 
technology. 
The plant has more automation than any other car plant. D-H 
boasts over 2000 computer-controlled devices including 260 robots 
used to weld, seal, paint, assemble, and inspect the cars. It 
also utilizes a fleet of automated guided vehicles (AGVs) to 
transport car bodies through the plant. The plant is also one of 
the first to use an automatic vehicle identification (AVI) 
. 
system. This consists of a transponder attached to each car 
which communicates the identification of each vehicle through the 
plant computer.network to the local controller. The controller 
then selects the appropriate program to run each piece of 
equipment. 
The p~oblems with these automated systems have been widely 
reported. The AVI system could not process the data needed to 
operate the robots.as fast as the line could run. As a result, 
the robots and·cars waited for the commands to operate the 
. 
. :equipment. Other problems included: robots painting each other, 
rework of·many welds on a manual line, AGVs sitting idle waiting 
to be programmed, and an automated wheel installation which 
proved slower and more costly than the manual method it replaced. 
Oth~r_technology was improperly located. For example, an i 
automated vision system at Hamtramck, which inspects gaps between 
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body panels made at another plant was torn down and moved to the 
t. 
body plant so the bad panels would be found before being 
assembled. 
Many of the process problems were attributed to the complexity 
and debugging of these new car designs. The cars produced at 
Hamtramck have the most s~phisticated electron.ics in the world. 
. 
~ 
The cars have three on-board computers which communicate with 
each other, making body wiring extremely complex. 
Finally, the logistics systems had many problems. The plant 
relies entirely on just-in-time deliveries to supply parts to the 
assembl-y line. However, the plant experienced so many late 
deliveries that the assembly line was frequently shut down. 
In addition to the process and product, the people related 
problems have been equally complex. Many of the 5000 workers 
came from engine and stamping plants, with little assembly 
experience. The combination of complex products and processes 
with an inexperienced workforce resulted in a long learning 
curve. GM reports that over two million man-hours of training 
have been required. 
In summary, the project was much too ambitious; as a result the 
recently renovated:assembly plants in Linden, NJ and Wilmington, 
DE were brought on-line with a much more realistic schedule • 
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They·a1so received many suggestions for improvement .from the D-H 
plant management. After one and a half years, the Detroit-
Hamtramck plant is now running near its original production and 
quality objectives. However, the plant does not appear to have 
achieved the significant productivity improvement necessary to 
justify the tremendous investment. As GM has since learned, 
their are much cheaper and more effective ways. to imp.rove 
automaking prod~ctivity. 
• 
New United Motors Manufacturing Incorporated (NUMMI) 
The beginnings of NUMMI and·GM's Saturn Corp. subsidiary can both 
be traced to the summer of 1981. At that time, a GM cost study 
revealed that the subcompacts-car, to be introduced in 1984, 
could be built in Japan for $2000 less than in the U.S., largely 
because o( more efficient Japanese production methods. ''It takes 
GM an average of 130 worker-hours to produce a car. The Japanese 
average is 7 O to 7 5 hours per ,car ( 2 2] • '' Other factors 
contributing to·the lower cost in Japan were: lower labor rates, 
a weak yen-dollar relationship, and Japanese tax breaks for 
exports. Instead of building the s-car, General Motors decided 
to find out how to reduce that enormous cost gap. 
22 t b • For une, Fe. 4, 1985; p.78. 
45 
• 
... 
GM initiated.Project Saturn as a long range answer to the 
' I 
Japanese competition. However, they needed short tezm sources 
for competitive small cars. GM signed agreements to import cars 
from Suzuki and Isuzu in Japan, but these quantities were limited· 
by the U.S. Government's automobile import quotas. 
These conditions led General Motors to agree to a joint venture 
with Toyota, Japan's leading carmaker and the reputed- most 
efficient auto manufacturer in the world. The companies agreed \ 
set up a separa~~\company, New United Motors Manufacturing Inc., . .,,,J 
to produce Toyota designed subcompact cars at GM's then closed 
Fremont, California plant. Toyot~ ~ould have total 
'• 
responsibility to setup and operate the plant. GM would market 
the cars through its Chevrolet Division. The plant workers would 
be represented by the United Auto Workers (UAW). 
NUMMI offered a great deal to both General Motors and Toyota. GM 
would h~ve a world-class subcompact car to market without the $2 
billion design investment. The initial product produced at 
Fremont would be a variation of the Toyota Corolla marketed as 
the Chevrolet Nova. NUMMI also gave GM the opportunity to learn 
how Toyota manufactures cars. Toyota was under protectionist. 
pressure to build cars in the U.S •• They wanted to find out 
whether they could build good-quality cars in the U.S. with 
American suppliers and American workers. NUMMI offered Toyota an 
opportunity to sell an additional 200,000 cars per year in the 
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U.S. and a training ground from which to design American Toyota 
plants. Toyota is now building an assembly plant in Georgetown, 
Kentucky • 
. Results 
) 
NUMMI transformed one of GM's most troublesome workforces into a 
model of harmony. The plant builds very good cars; NUMMI's 
Chevrolet Nova ranks highest in customer satisfaction and lowest 
in warranty repairs of all GM cars. Not only does NUMMI produce 
quality cars, its productivity is higher than nearly all GM 
assembly plants, despite the fact that it is among the least 
automated. 
{ 
\. 
\ 
\ 
NUMMI attributes their success to the following three factors. 
1) GM, Toyota, and the UAW agreed to the most innovative 
labor contract in the U.S. auto industry today. The plant 
management and workers have abandoned their adversarial 
roles, and are working together to "build the highest-· 
quality auto in the world at the lowest possible cost to the 
consumer [ 2 3] • '' Workers are divided into teams which are 
responsible for problem resolution and training. There are 
23. Iron Age, Sept. 5, 1986; p. 29. 
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.. 
just two job classifications, one for production workers and 
one for skilled tradesmen. This allows for much greater 
workforce flexibility and productivity. 
2) The plant was designed for much more efficient production 
. 
flows than typical GM operations. Stamping of body panels 
is done on-site and is synchronized with assembly. The· 
plant automation is not state-of-the-art but is simple and 
designed for easy setup and repair. It al~o is very 
reliable and was proven in other Toyota plants. This, in 
conjunction with meticulous maintenance, results in minimal 
-line downtime. Another key to efficiency is standardized 
!'i work design. Workers and engineers jointly determine the 
best way to perform each job. These methods are continually 
refined by the work groups, 
3) Quality is the top priority. Quality problems have been 
greatly reduced; no longer is repair accepted as a regular 
part of the process. For example, suppliers are required to 
produce to standards beyond the levels at GM plqnts. Some 
• GM plants supplying parts to NUMMI had to add a final 100% 
inspection to assure parts met requirements. NUMMI works 
- ( 
very closely with suppliers to assure acceptable quality 
levels are maintained. As a result of the improved quali~y 
levels, the plant runs much more,--·smoothly than comparable GM 
plants. 
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NUMMI's success does not mean new manufacturing technologies are 
not needed • 
• 
''In the American auto industry we've not yet become familiar enough with the new technologies to meld them with people'' says GMF Robotics President Eric Mittelstadt. ''To ~ 
say that NUMMI proves that less automation is better than 
more is like judging a five-speed bicycle when it wins a 
race against a ten-speed without regard to the riders or the 
conditions of the race [24].'' 
NUMMI is proving that a total approach to production systems -
suppliers, labor, automation, and management - is the key to 
world-class manufacturing. 
Saturn Corporation 
.. 
General Motors created Saturn Corporation to address the same 
competitiveness problem as NUMMI. It began in June 1982, when a 
select group of engineers began work on an unnamed project at 
GM's Tech Center in Warren, Michigan. Their goal said GM Vice 
Chairman Howard Kehrl, was ''to look at every aspect of our 
business with a fresh eye to see how we can reduce cost while 
improving quality, efficiency, and job satisfaction [25].'' 
24. Iron Age, Sept. 5, 1986; p. 34. 
25 I • ron·Age, Nov. 7, 1986; p. 34Al 
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The project team grew to 325 salaried employees over the next 
year and a half. 
The project had no deadline and was under no obligation to use 
existing GM parts, processes, or plants. It was also a 'no 
~ 
excuses' project'. Nothing would be spared to assure the project 
was a success. For the first time in GM's history, hourly 
workers would help design the new car and plant. A group of 99 
people were selected from among plant managers, personnel 
• 
~ directors, production-line workers, union stewards, and others . 
• 
This 'Group of 99' were organized into seven subcommittees, 
. 
focusing on seven areas of manufacturing. The group traveled all 
over the world in order to find the best in manufacturing 
excellence. The groups recommendations became the basis for a 
revolutionary new labor contract. 
In November 1983, the program was formally announced as Project 
Saturn. The initial o.bjective of Saturn was to develop a world-
class subcompact car, starting with a 'clean-sheet-of-paper'. 
The lessons learned from Saturn would then be adapted (or 
'saturnized') to other GM plants. To assure the separation of 
this project from the other GM operations, a separate company -
Saturn Corporation - was formed in January 1985. GM committed $5 
billion to the new corporation over its first five years, for 
Saturn to achieve its objectives. In June 1985, GM announced 
that the Saturn manufacturing complex will be in Spring Hill, 
50 
' 
. 
-.·-,<~-~ ~-~: Oa••.~~ .• ~•• ---,a--r-;~~-~,-~u- -u , •=' • •~• ~--~--~~~-~ •• • ~~~ ~u, ~-= ~--~- ~~-, -• -·~~~7~• ~r- •~r,, - ~-~~r,c"._ ••<> ~-~~-~-~~••=•~--·-• ,.,= ~~~ ~=~,-~, ·• • -
• 
Tennessee. ·The integrated facility is to include engine 
manufacturing, stamping, plastic molding, and final assembly 
processes. 
Applying the Lessons Learned 
The Saturn project team sought to apply the lessons learned from 
their extensive research in how cars are designed and 
• 
" 
manufactured throughout the world. They drew upon the problems 
with many of GM's automation projects such as Hamtramck and the 
• Saginaw Division's Vanguard plant, which has the most advanced 
plant communication network in the world, using the Manufacturing 
Automation· Protocol (MAP) system. The team also studied closely 
the operations at the NUMMI plant in Fremont, Californ~a. In 
fact, much of the Saturn labor agreement is an outgrowth of the 
NUMMI labor contract. 
The Saturn labor agreement, signed by GM and the UAW in July 
1985, is a revolutionary change in auto labor relations. The 
partnership between workers and management is best exemplified by 
the nature of the contract: it can be changed by ·mutual consent 
at any time. Other major departures from existing contracts 
include: 
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1) The union will have veto power over decisions at all 
levels. Saturn will be run by consensus, although the UAW 
will retain the right to strike. 
2) Factory workers will earn a salary, rather than hourly 
wages. The base salary will be 20% below prevailing 
industry rates; ~he remaining earnings will be through 
bonuses tied to plant output and profits. 
3) Worker-management distinctions are blurred. There will 
be no·time clocks, no reserved parking, and no separate 
management cafeteria. 
4) Job classifications will be limited to a maximum of six. 
Production will be by work teams of six to 15 operators 
without a foreperson. The group wi11 be organized much like 
those at the NUMMI plant. 
Saturn's factory workers will be treated like stakeholders. In 
. 
addition, employees will be taught to handle their new status and 
_responsibilities during three to six months of company paid 
training. 
During the last two years ~M has slowly changed the goals for 
Saturn. GM gave up on the original purpose of becoming ''cost 
competitive with the lowest priced imports'' after entries from 
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Korea and Yugoslavia entered the U.S. market. Consequently, the 
• 
car itself is now larger. It is now positioned between GM's J-
car subcompacts, such as the Chevrolet cavalier, and its midsize 
cars, such as the Oldsmobile Ciera. The car now appears to be 
positioned against Japan's increasingly popular compacts, such as 
the Honda Accord and Toyota Camry. 1 
GM also seems more cautious about the market for Saturn. They 
have scaled back the initial investment in the Saturn plant in 
half, to $1.7 billion for an annual capacity of 250,000 cars. A · 
second factory will be added only if sales warrant one. 
The level of process technology in the Saturn plant has also been 
scaled back. "Its probably less automation than the original 
• • 
concept,'' concedes Saturn president Richard G. '.~kip' LeFauve. 
"More emphasis will be placed on innovative labor-management 
practices [26]." 
One thing hasn't changed. Saturn still promises a car that will 
be designed and built like no other in the world. For example, 
parts are being designed to require less energy and materials. 
Those two ·components account for over half the cost of 
production. Engines, steel body panels, and many plastic parts 
will be manufactured at the same site as final assembly. As a 
result, production flows can be more easily controlled, 
26
• Business Week, March 16, 1987; p. 107. 
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inventories can be minimized, and transportation and rework costs 
will be greatly reduced. The final assembly area will no longer 
consist', of one big line that can not move faster than its slowest 
assembly step. Saturn plans to build car modules in ··separate 
areas. The modules can then be assembled on a much shorter and 
more flexible final assembly line. 
COMMENTARY 
The lessons of NUMMI and Hamtramck have led General Motors.to 
alter its corporate plans of relying primarily on advanced 
technologies in their attempt to regain competitiveness . 
. 
Further, the problems at Hamtramck have warned GM of the dangers 
of starting up too much new technology all at once. As a result 
of these lessons, Saturn is now as much geared toward improving 
1 
the human involvement in auto production as in the product and 
processes for their new factory. 
To succeed in this competitive environment GM must do the 
following: 
1) The car must be designed to meet market needs better than 
competitive cars. 
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2) The production processes must be designed to maximize the 
benefits of both reliable technology and a skilled 
workforce. The processes must be controllable to achieve 
consistently high quality cars. 
• 
3) The Saturn management and production workers must 
maintain a strong partnership, willing to do whatever it 
takes to succeed. 
The results from Saturn should give a good indication of the 
future of General Motors. GM Chairman Roger Smith commented, 
''Saturn is the key to GM's long term competitiveness, 
survival, and success as a domestic producer. We expect 
that what we learn from Saturn will spread throughout GM, 
improving the efficiency and competitiveness of every plant 
we operate and every product we build [27]. '' 
27. Iron Age, Nov. 7, 1986, p. 35. 
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GENERAL ELECTRIC MAJOR APPLIANCE BUSINESS GROUP (GE MABG) 
INTRODUCTION 
This case study analyzes the rejuvenation of GE's appliance 
business which commenced in 1979 with the 'Project C' dishwasher 
development and continued through 1987 with rejuvenation efforts 
across their entire appliance business. 
The study demonstrates the business success which can be achieved 
by applying the strategic concept of manufactur\ng as a 
competitive weapon. GE management adopted strategic objectives 
directed toward implementing the necessary product, process, and 
organizational changes to satisfy market needs. 
NATURE OF BUSINESS 
In 1979 the General Electric Major Appliance Business Group (GE 
MABG) was the leading U.S. manufacturer of major household 
appliances. It produced GE and Hotpoint refrigerators, ranges, 
1/' 
-, 
microwave ovens, home laundry appliances, dishwashers, and 
disposal uni ts. MABG headquarters were in Louis.ville, Kentucky, 
with manufacturing facilities in Louisville and many other 
locations. Distribution was through two principal channels - · 
building contractors (30%) and retail stores (70%). Sales in 
1979 approache~ $2 billion. 
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The industry was dominated by five broad-line manufacturers, GE, 
Whirlpool, White Consolidated, Magic Chef, and Raytheon (Amana 
division), together with three specialist firms, KitchenAid 
(division of Hobart), Maytag, and Design & Manufacturing Corp. 
(D&M). j 
The U.S. appliance business in 1979 could be characterized as: 
slow market growth, established distribution channels, stable 
competitive situation with few major manufacturers, long product 
life cycles, and large aging manufacturing facilities with 
minimal investment in automation and significant labor 
difficulties. Competition from foreign sources was nonexistent. 
Dishwasher Business 
The GE dishwasher business generated $235 million in sales in 
1979. Net income was $7.5 million, resulting in a 3.2% return on 
sales. This represented a significant improvement from the 
recession years of the mid- 1970's. GE was the leading producer 
of dishwashers with a 28% market share. They offered a full 
range of machines with strength in the mid and low cost models. 
Other leading manufacturers.were D&M, who specialized in 
~ inexpensive private label models (including Sears), Whirlpool, 
with strength in mid-range prod~cts, and KitchenAid, who 
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specialized in premium dishwashers. Dishwashers were the only 
major appliance experiencing significant sales growth. Sales 
were anticipated to continue to grow at a 15% annual rate during 
the early 1980's. 
GE marketed dishwashers under two brand names, GE and Hotpoint. 
Hotpoint was viewed as the company's 'value' brand while the GE 
brand served as the 'quality' line. GE brand dishwashers were 
manufactured in Lotil.sville (plant AP-3) ; Hotpoint and private 
label brands were produced in Milwaukee. Portable and built-in. 
units were produced in both plants. Annual dishwasher capacity 
figures were: Louisville - 700,000 units and Milwaukee - 215,000 
u.ni ts. 
Competitive Analysis 
"MABG management viewed its dishwasher business as a problem in 
the early 1970's, despite market share exceeding 20% in the 
, 
retail channel and 30% in the contract channel (28% overall), and 
generally strong financial performance [ 28] • '' While GE was 
producing other appliances of premium quality, consumers viewed 
their dishwashers as adequate machines of medium quality. Also, 
GE management was aware of the rapid product improvement and 
28. Harvard Business School Case 9-585-053; p. 3 
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process automation of leading Japanese appliance manufacturers. 
They became concerned that unless GE improved their products and 
processes significantly, foreign suppliers may attack their 
markets. 
Most GE dishwashers were built differently from most competitive 
models during the 1970's. Whereas most dishwasher tubs and door 
~ 
liners were constructed of porcelain-coated ste~l, many GE models 
were made of plastic-coated steel. The GE machines were very 
susceptible to rusting du~ to scratches penetrating the plastic 
coating. Rust was unsightly and reduced the life of the 
machines. Also, GE dishwashers were excessively noisy, used 
large amounts of water (and energy), and had a high rate of 
warranty repairs. GE shared cost leadership among dishwasher 
producers with D & M. GE was able to use this cost advantage to 
become the leading supplier of full-line kitchen appliance 
packages to the contractor market. However, their retail sales 
business was not nearly as strong, particularly in the high-end, 
high-profit segment • 
• 
• 
BUSINESS STRATEGY 
GE set out in 1977 to develop a new line of built-in dishwashers 
and to overhaul the Louisville assembly plant which would produce 
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this new line. The goals of this plan were to capture a larger 
share of this growing market and to increase profitability. MABG 
., . ~ . management had two key obJectives: ••to build a better product'' 
~. 
that better satisfied customer needs and ••to build the product 
better'' with· improved productivity and product quality. This 
major undertaking was known as Project c. 
Project C 
The Project C development team consisted of thirteen members, 
• including representatives from each of MABG's functional areas. 
This was the first effort within MABG where the design of the 
product and manufacturing process were integrated from the 
outset. In the fall of 1979, the team proposed fundamental 
changes to GE's built-in dishwasher line and installation of a 
new, robot-equipped production process. Computers would control 
the eight key processes: injection molding, steel fabrication, 
welding, steel finishing, plastic and metal subassembly, main 
assembly, product testing, and material handling. 
The new product and process would be introduced in 1983. Plant 
renovations in Louisville would be performed alongside ongoing 
dishwasher production in the plant. The proposed changes were: 
·60 
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(1) Improve product quality by introducing a new product 
design,known as PermaTuf c. The new design included 
tightening manufacturing tolerances and replacing the 
plastic-coated tub with an all-plastic tub made of a 
proprietary GE material. This design reduced product weight 
by nearly 20 lbs~, cutting transportation costs by nearly 
' 
$1.00 per unit. 
(2) Implement a focused factory by dedicating the dishwasher 
facility to a smaller number of similar products. The new 
line of bJt1t-in dishwashers would be produced in Louisville 
and the portable models would be transferred to the 
' Milwaukee plant. The number of SKUs (stock keeping units) 
produced in the plant would be reduced by 80% and nine miles 
of assembly line would be replaced by fewer than three 
miles. 
(3) Model design standardization. Every model was designed 
around a single tub, door, and support structure 'core.' As 
a result, the assembly process would be identical for all 
models for the first several steps. The total parts count 
was cut by over one-third. 
(4) Reduce inventories and material handling by implementing 
'point-of-use' manufacturing and just-in-time inventory 
. 
. 
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management concepts. These two initiatives were projected 
to double the inventory turnover rate. 
(5) Implement an extensive quality improvement program 
including: tightened vendor quality standards, introduction 
of statistical process control procedures, production 
employee involvement in process design and improvement 
(quality circles), computerized process monitoring and 
control, and greatly improved testing methods. These 
changes, in conjunction with the product design changes, 
were expected to reduce scrap, rework, and warranty costs. 
As a result, reduced service calls alone accounted for $2.00 
per unit cost savings. 
(6) Implement advanced automated manufacturing systems. The 
assembly line was fully automated through the use of 
asynchronous conveyor systems, laser scanners, PLCs 
(programmable logic controllers), robots, and other· assembly 
automation equipment. The automation would eliminate 300 
repetitive line jobs, offset partly by increased quality 
audit, maintenance, and process control personnel. In all, 
. ' 
labor requirements were to be reduced by over 100. This 
resulted in a $1.00 per unit,labor cost savings. 
The required investment to implement Project c was estimated at 
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'' $28 million; cost reductions from the investment totaled $11.43 
per unit. 
The Project C team estimated that the new product line would 
increase GE's market share 2% by 1989. According to the team's 
most probable scenario, the project would generate product cost 
savings of $75 million by 1989, yielding an IRR (internal rate of 
return) of 25%. 
In addition to the product and process changes, GE Project C 
management drastically changed th~ir attitudes toward.employees· 
and. the labor unions involvement. Previously, because attempts 
to make similar changes in Louisville had met union resistance, 
GE man~g~ment waited until plans had been fully developed and 
r 
approved before seeking the cooperation of the work force. In 
contrast, the Project C team believed that the projected benefits 
could only be achieved if the work force were involved in project 
development and committed to achieving the quality and 
productivity goals of the company. 
The employee involvement program was developed to break down many 
of the barriers between management and the work force. 
Management developed a sequential communications program to show 
union ·officials why the drastic changes were necessary. Much 
more market and financial information was disclosed to the work 
force. At the conclusion of this process union officials agreed 
that changes were imperative in the interests of productivity, 
quality, .and job preservation. 
Results 
The GE board of directors approved the initial Project C 
appropriation request in December 1980. The new automated 
factory was completed and the new line of low and medium priced 
dishwashers were introduced in 1983. New high-end models, 
introduced in 1985 incorporating the PermaTuf c design are 
produced in the same automated factory. The results - measured 
by product market success, increased profitability, improved 
labor relations, and development of concepts and technologies 
which have been very successful for other business units - were 
better than expected. 
GE's dishwasher market share reached 39% in 1986, 11% greater 
than in 1980 according to APPLIANCE, and well above original 
projections. MABG's earnings doubled from 1982 to 1983, 
increased another 43% in 1984, and then leveled off in 1985. 
According to Richard L. Burke, V. P. MABG Production Division: ''We 
spent over $60 million on Project c. It is a showcase for all 
our new concepts in process ••• concentrating on one product and 
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(. 
building it the best in the world [29]." This investment 
" j 
included the original $28 million through 1982 and additional 
funds to incre~se capacity and enhance line performance through 
1986. 
In addition to the success of the GE dishwasher lines, the 
company won contracts to produce two leading private-label 
product lines. Magic Chef dishwashers have been produced in 
Louisville since August 1983. GE added the Tappan line in 
November of that- year. 
After the.ir success with dishwashers, MABG began to expanded 
their rejuvenation efforts to their other core businesses. Their 
next step was to modernize their refrigeration businesses. 
Product innovations include a new line of rotary compressors for 
refrigerators and air conditioners, and development of three new 
refrigerator lines. The company invested $132 million in their 
Columbia, Tennessee plant for the highly automated rotary 
compressor line which was completed in 19861• 
The rotary compressors were designed into two innovative new 
refrigerator product lines. The first of two new lines.went into 
production during the summer of 1987; the second line is 
expected to be in production by August, 1988. These products are 
being manufactured in two extensively renovated plants at 
29. Appliance, June 1986; p. GE-21 
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Appliance Park in Louisville. The new facilities clearly surpass 
the Project c dishwasher facility in many ways. Says Thomas E. 
Dunham, VP and General Manager of Production, ''Manufacturing has 
moved far and fast in the past 4 years ••• What Project C was to 
dishwashers in 1983, our new operation is to refrigerators -
probably several times over (30]. '' The new refrigerator 
. 
operation covers 2.3 million sq. ft. One building houses the 
refrigeration systems (condenser, evaporator, and related parts) 
manufacturing operation. The other contains the final assembly 
and testing of the refrigerators. This modernization, costing 
$106 million, will increase production of top-mount, no~frost 
refrigerators to more than 1 million refrigerators in 1988. The 
design of the manufacturing processes emphasize an even greater 
commitment to quality than Project c. The quality enhancements 
include: extensive in-line product verification, self correcting 
closed-loop process controls, non-synchronous conveyor syste~s, 
., 
and ergonomically designed workstations. The later two help 
create a moreerelaxed, quality-focused environment. The quality 
efforts appear to be paying off; reportedly, ''the new line has 
been producing refrigerators with a service call rate 30 percent 
better than previous models [31]. '' 
The next major investment in refrigerators will be a $160 million 
at the Decatur, Alabama plant, which currently produces single 
30. Appliance, December 1987; p. 40. 
31. Appliance, December 1987; p. 44. 
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door and cycle defrost refrigerators~ The entire refrigeration 
modernization plan includes over $400 million in renovations to 
six plants. 
GE MABG management plans to invest over $1 billion to revitalize 
their other appliance products and factories. following the 
• 
refrigeration investment, the company is expected to focus 
attention on its range manufacturing at Appliance Park, Colombia, 
Maryland, and the newly acquired Roper Division in Lafayette, 
. Geo~gia. These actions demonstrate that GE is clearly committed 
• 
to maintaining their competitive advantage. According to Roger 
w. Schimpke, MABG Senior Vice President: 
''We basically have our sights set squarely on three tenets. 
The first is to produce the highest quality major appliances 
in the world. The second is to accomplish that from a cost 
leadership position, and third, to continue to bring 
innovation to the products in order to increase our market 
share [ 32]. ·'' 
Competitive Implications 
The success of Project C not only affected the future plans of GE 
MABG but also created a competitive edge for GE over its 
competitors in the appliance business. several competitors have 
made aggressive moves to keep up, including product improveme~ts, 
~ 
32. Appliance, June 1986; p. GE-19 
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process automation projects, as well as corporate consolidations. 
Major automation projects include: Whirlpool-Clyde, Ohio; 
Electrolux-Bristol, Tennessee; White Consolidated-Columbus (OH) 
Products; iecent consolidations include: General Electric & 
Roper; Whirlpool & KitchenAid; Electrolux, White Consolidated, 
and Design & Manufacturing Corp.; and Maytag & Magic Chef. This 
. increased domestic competition has reduced the near term threat 
of imports from foreign manufacturers. However, a few foreign 
competitors are considering setting up manufacturing facilities 
in the U.S •. Also, American manufacturers are now looking to 
foreign Jnarkets to expand their businesses. 
WHIRLPOOL APPLIANCE GROUP 
Whirlpool, GE's leading appliance competitor has demonstrated a 
commitment to meet the competitive challenge. According to 
Whirlpool President Dave Whitwam, "In 1984 we began a $1 billion 
capital expenditure program to reqesign products, plants, and 
production lines. The objective: higher volumes achieved more 
efficiently in 30% less space [33].". 
33 1 
• Industry Week, Sept. 21, 1987; p. 56. 
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Since l.985 Whirlpool has entered the high-end niche 'through the 
acquisition of KitchenAid, increased the company's interest in· 
several global appliance alliances, and entered the kitchen 
cabinet business. 
penalty. 
. ,. . . This changeover has had a short-term financial 
''Whirlpool says its' willing to sacrifice some short-term 
profits to insure future growth [34].'' 
"We have to take action to protect our home base from 
foreign competition and, at the same time, look for foreign 
growth potential for our products •.•• We can no longer 
conduct business on a strictly domestic basis [35]. '' 
It appears the major appliance business is headed down the same 
road as the auto makers. Global alliances, multi-national 
manufacturing capabilities, and the competition for growing 
markets in developing countries - will develop during the next 
ten years. 
3.4. Industry Week, Sept. 21, 1987; p. 56. 
35
• Appliance Manufacturer, August 1986; p. 72. 
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COMMENTARY 
The success of GE's dishwasher rejuvenation efforts can be 
attributed partly to technological innovation in new materials, 
product designs,. and processes. However, the-keys to their 
success were the forward looking business plans and the major 
organizational changes which facilitated the technological 
innovations. The integration of product and process design, the 
application of the•focused factory concept, and the commitment of 
the work force to improved quality and competitiveness were the 
foundation that the business success was built on. 
·' 
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ALLEN~BRADLEY INDUSTRIAL CONTROLS DIVISION 
INTRODUCTION 
Allen-Bradley Inc. (A-B), a Rockwell International company since 
1986, is a leading manufacturer of industrial controls and 
factor·y automation syste~s. A-B headquarters are in Milwaukee, 
WI; annual sales are about $1.2 billion. 
The A-B Industrial Controls Division is, the largest supplier of 
contactors and relays in the U.S .. These products serve as 
electromechanical starters and controllers for industrial .. 
electrical motors. Contactors and relays account for about 10% 
of Allen-Bradley's sales. They are a very important business to 
A-B because they are an integral part of other electrical 
equipment that the company sells. 
Until the early 1980's the company's business was primarily 
focused on the North American market. Their contactors were 
designed in accordance with the National Electrical Manufacturers 
Association (NEMA) standards. ·The company did little business 
overseas, as the European and Asian markets primarily followed 
International Electrical Commission (IEC) standards. 
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NEMA products are designed to be durable and can be repaired 
simply by replacing worn parts. IEC products, on the other hand, 
were designed to be replaced rather than repaired. Also, they 
are much smaller than NEMA products and tend to be more 
application specific. IEC contactors are approximately 1/3 the 
size and weight of NEMA models.· They also are much less 
I 
expensive. 
1 
Allen-Bradley was the market leader in NEMA contactors. Their 
products successfully competed with those of cutler-Hammer, 
Square D, General Electric, and many smaller producers. They 
were making comfortable profits in a stable, moderately 
competitive domestic market. 
ALLEN-BRADLEY IEC CONTACTORS 
Threat to Allen-Bradley 
In the late 1970's, manufacturers of IEC contactors began a 
--.........-.,. 
concerted effort to break into the North American market. Their 
l immediate impact was slight, but Allen-Bradley management 
recognized the potential threat to their business. By the early . 
1980's the advantages of IEC products to American companies 
became well known. Also, the influx of European and Japanese 
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controls brought more IEC contactors to the U.S •• It appeared 
. that the IEC contactors would eventually become a world standard. 
Allen-Bradley first dealt with the threat by strategic planning. 
They analyzed their new competition and compared capabilities. 
They found that companies such as Siemens, ASEA, and Kleckner-
Moeller from West Germany, Telemecanique from France, and 
Mitsubishi from Japan were strong adversaries. They were selling 
high quality IEC contactors in the U.S. for less than A-B could 
make them·using their present manufacturing practices. The 
company realized that they were in trouble. They needed to offer 
competitive IEC contactors and relays or risk losing a large 
portion of their core business. 
Allen-Bradley's management weighed four strategic options to 
remain competitive in this business: 1) Create a foreign IEC 
manufacturing subsidiary capable of producing lower cost 
products; 2) Joint ventures with leading IEC contactor 
manufacturers, thus sharing their market with foreign competitors 
in order gain a foothold in the IEC contactor business and to 
learn how to regain competitiveness; 3) Marketing under license 
from an IEC producer - giving up on manufacturing IEC contactors · 
• 
and sharing the profits with a competitor; and 4) Developing a 
new approach to contactor manufacturing which will allow their 
U.S. plants to compete with European and Asian contactor sources. 
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In order to choose their strategy, A-B executives and engineers 
traveled to Europe and Japan to study IEC markets, manufacturing 
practices, and their competitors. They found their major 
competitors had manufacturing capabilities equal or better to 
their own. The Europeans were successful by being very adept 
. 
exporters. The Japanese were now producing very high quality 
goods. Their plants had comparable equipment to A-B, but they 
were organized to eliminate virtually all waste. The Japanese 
didn't inspect quality into the product, rather they took a 
preventive approach. The Allen-Bradley planners identified the 
strategic response gaps between their capabilities and their 
competitors. They then developed objectives and plans to 
eliminate those gaps. 
The company chose to develop a new IEC product and locate the 
plant in the U.S .. They ruled out joint ventures and licensing 
because they felt capable of eliminating the competitive gaps. 
According to J.W. Pearce, the division's director of power 
products marketing: "We .had to move from a defensive position to 
an aggressive position in the world market [36]." · The company 
l . 
also ruled out a foreign manufacturing subsidiary despite the 
. 
appeal of lower labor rates. They found many problems and hidden 
costs associated with such an operation, such as lack of skilled 
workers, numerous support personnel, added transportation costs, 
36
. Manufacturing Engineering, April 1986, p. 45. 
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and communications difficulties. Allen-Bradley felt these 
problems negated the labor cost advantages in this case. 
The company recogni~ed that the only way they could compete in 
this business with an American manufacturing facility was to 
automate. A-B management approved an investment of $15 million 
in a new computer integrated manufact~ring line that they 
# 
believed would make IEC contactors at the lowest possible ·cost. 
In addition to the above reasons, it is clear that Allen-Bradley 
intended to use this line as a showcase for the company's factory 
automation products and technical expertise. 
!EC Contactor Product and Process Development 
This project was A-B's first effort at simultaneous product and 
process development. The Industrial Controls Group management 
felt that this approach was necessary to the success of this 
program. Early in the.project an initial process and assembly 
sequence was devised., The near-thirty.member development team 
then prepared a detailed plan covering all phases of the 
manufacturing process, from material handling through product 
packaging. 
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Next came the design of the product. Personnel from all 
disciplines were involved in creating the p,,roduct specifications. 
The electrical and_mechanical product specifications were 
developed simultaneously because according to George Plonski, 
team member responsible for electrical engineering: ''close 
communication between different disciplines results in equipment 
which is an electromechanical unit rather than a mechanism with a 
control attached [37].'' The design allows for over 4000 
different product variations in two contactor sizes; 770 were 
initially released. 
The engin.eering team then developed the equipment for the line. 
Sixty percent of the equipment was designed and constructed by 
. 
.-. 
Allen-Bradley personnel; the remainder was purchased from outside 
sources. All the equipment is highly standardized to assure 
compatibility. The close coordination between A-Band machine 
', 
. ' :--~ 
suppliers makes it hard to identify the source of each machine. 
As the project moved forward, the team concentrated on the 
quality and consistency of the contactor component parts. ••·rt 
became apparent just how critical part quality would be", says 
team member Val Kukuljan, "because if you do not have consistency 
in parts, you simply do not have reliable automation [ 38] • '' 
Statistical process control is used extensively in the two 
37
• Mechanical Engineering,'April 1986, p. 46. 
· 38 
• Manufacturing Engineering, April 1986, p. 46-7. 
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manufacturing cells feeding the assembly line - molding and 
contact fabrication. 
Allen-Bradley also developed an extensive training program to 
coincide with the contactor project. The company recognized that 
skill levels needed to be improved if this project was to 
succeed. This training program included: educating the workforce 
about competition, educating managers to be better communicators, 
and v~rious vocational training classes for production workers, 
engineers, and technicians. 
IEC Contactor Flexible Manufacturing System 
The system consists of 26 machines which assemble, test, and 
package the product. The assembly sequence is roughly as 
follows: 1) cross bar/armature, 2) base/yoke/barcode line, 3) 
main assembly station, 4) terminal insert, 5) arc quench, 6) 
noise test, 7) electrical test, 8) screw back-off, 9) packaging, 
and 10) accumulator. These stations are connected by an 
integrated material handling system. Each machine is supervised 
by an A-B PLC 2/30 programmable controller. The 26 controllers 
are directed by a PLC-3 master controller (another serves as 
backup). A Digital Equipment VAX 11/780 minicomputer manages the 
system and interfaces with the company's IBM mainframe. 
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The line was designed to control each process statistically. 
More than 3500 data collection points and 350 assembly test 
points check each component and the final product as it 
progresses from station to station. The system adapts process 
parameters based on test results. 
The company chose to locate the line in their Milwaukee complex. 
The eighth floor of SO-year-old Building 40 was totally renovated 
for .this program. The design and coordination of extensive 
building modifications required six months for six engineers to 
complete. The system began operation in April 1985. 
The line was originally designed to produce in batch mode. This 
was later altered to produce just-in-time after receipt of 
customer order. The system is able to automatically assemble, 
test, and package orders at a rate of 600 units per hour, in lots 
as small as one, without slowing down or stopping the process. 
Contactors and relays of different sizes and types are freely 
intermingled on the assembly line. The total cycle time per 
contactor through the line is 45 minutes. The JIT system reduced 
inventory levels from five months on hand to five days. This 
approach was seen as a necessary component of a world class 
manufacturing system which produces high quality products at the 
lowest possible cost. Allen-Bradley disclosed that their cost of 
IEC contactors was $6.42 in early 1986. This compares quite 
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favorably with their original estimate of nearly $20 using 
conventional manufacturing systems. 
The CIM process works on a five level control hierarchy, as 
follows: 
1) Customer orders from all over the world are sent 
electronically to the Milwaukee mainframe computer. • Using 
the company's MRP II system, the mainframe integrates these 
orders with manufacturing, sales, and accounting data. 
r 
2) At 5 a.m. each day, all orders from the previous 24 hours 
are sent to the VAX minicomputer. 
3) The VAX translates the orders into specific production 
requirements and schedules the production. It then 
transmits the first two production orders to the master 
controller over a local area network. The next order is 
transmitted after completion of the first. The VAX also 
transmits management information back to the mainframe. 
4) The master controller instructs each local controller 
which assembly,· test, or packaging process to perform. It 
instructs each to change over automatically at the start of 
a new lot. This'eliminates all set-up and changeover time. 
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5) The local controllers communicate with the plant floor 
• 
equipment. The many sensing and control devices respond to 
upper level commands. 
The quality management system is integrated into this control 
scheme. If a product is rejected, the system automatically 
starts to build a new one. The finisped products are accumulated 
at the end of the line and routed to the appropriate 'alley', 
where they are automatically consolidated for each customer 
order. 
This assembly line represents a milestone in the development of 
Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) Systems. The key to the 
success of the system, according to Larry Yost, V.P. Operations 
for the Industrial Controls Group, "was finding a way to 
identify the products being assembled so the line would not have 
to be stopped to make a different version [ 39]. '' The 
breakthrough came by the development of a system using bar code 
labels to identify each product. The flexible assembly machines 
responding to specific bar codes make nearly instantaneous 
changes without slowing production. Occasionally, a barcode 
cannot be read and an alarm summons an operator. These 
occurrences are now quite infrequent. 
39 t • For une, May 26, 1987; p. 66. 
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The line was originally planned to run with just four operators 
to monitor the 26 machines. In early 1986 A-B had not yet met 
.that goal. The line is still undergoing debugging and process 
. 
improvements. ''The eventual goal", according to facility manager, 
John Rothwell, ''is to have the entire facility run by itself, 
with only one person - in the control room - to monitor it [40]." 
/ 
/ 
,. 
To aq6omplish this goal, considerable planning and experimenting 
are taking place. Projects under consideration include: voice 
simulation to inform the operators of significant events, robotic 
loading of parts reservoirs, and integration of a punch press to 
better control the manufacture of the product's metal components • 
• 
Allen-Bradley recognizes that this system offers them a 
tremendous competitive advantage, but they also realize that they 
can't sit back and rest on their accomplishments or their 
advantage and 'world class manufacturing' status will soon 
disappear. The company is now utilizing their competitive 
~dvantage to market these products aggressively worldwide. 
J 
40
• Manufacturing Engineering, April 1986; p. 48. 
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·COMMENTARY 
The Allen-Bradley case demonstrates that computer-integrated 
manufacturing systems, if developed and managed wisely, can be an 
effective means to improve competitiveness. This success has 
<; 
., 
caused many companies, determined that offshore or outsourced 
manufacturing was their only viable option, to reconsider 
investments in domestic manufacturing. 
Further, Allen-Bradley has openly shared their experiences and 
results. This case emphasizes that success can best be achieved 
by strategic planning, involvement of all functional areas, 
design and process simplification, commitment to quality, 
meticulous attention to detail, extensive training, and a great 
deal of hard work, which must continue. 
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HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY 
INTRODUCTION 
Hewlett-Packard (H-P) is a leading manufacturer of computing and 
measuring products with headquarters in Palo Alto, CA. With 
sales in 1986 in excess of $7.2 billion, H-P is among the 60 
largest industrial corporations in the U.S. The company is well 
respected for design and manufacture of high quality electronics 
products. H-P has recently received much recognition as a leader 
in 'World Class Manufacturing'_. (WCM). 
H-P's success in improving competitiveness through manufacturing 
innovation rivals that of the other companies studied. H-P has 
greatly improved productivity, product quality, and customer 
service. Their accomplishments are particularly note worthy 
because unlike the other firms, H-P has achieved these gains 
without large investments in new plants and factory automation. 
Much of their success has been through the application of Total 
Quality Control (TQC) and Just-In-Time (JIT) concepts. According 
to Richard Schonburger, ''Hewlett-Packard is farther along in 
implementing JIT than any other non-Japanese-owned company [ 41] • '' 
41. World Class Manufactu.ring; p. 40. 
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TQC/JIT 
.I 
H-P has not only applied TQC and JIT successfully in high volume 
products, where these concepts are commonly perceived to apply; 
but have also demonstrated excellent results in low volume, job 
shop environments. 
~ TQC/JIT at H-P were initiated in a bottoms-up manner. The first 
two JIT lines, operational in 1981, were at high volume, labor 
intensive sites; the printer plant in.Vancouver, WA and the 
Greeley, co disk drive plant. In both cases, the plant managers 
saw JIT as a potentially more competitive manufacturing approach 
in their very competitive markets. Their rapid manufacturing 
productivity improvements gained much attention. Top management 
increasingly backed JIT programs and by 1986 more than one-third 
of H-P's 57 divisions converted to JIT. 
Between 1979 and 1986, the company reports JIT was responsible 
for a company-wide reduction in inventories as a percent of sales 
from 20.1% to 14% (and a minuscule 6% in divisions using JIT), a 
conversion worth $439 million. In the same period, sales per 
employee rose 73%, and failure of products under warranty dropped 
an average of 21% annually. At particular plants, the results 
have been even more striking: inventory reductions of 60-80%, 
space reductions of 30-50%, lead times cut more than 50%, and 
labor cost reduction of 20-50% have been achieved. 
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H-P's APPROACH TO TQC/JIT 
The implementation of TQC and JIT at H-P plants was a continuous 
'"I:...') 
improvement process lasting several years, in which all functions 
participated. This process will be studied through the results 
achieved at the following sites: the HP 9000 computer workstation 
plant in Ft. Collins, co.; the Sunnyvale CA, plant producing HP 
150 and Vectra personal computers; and the San Diego, CA plant 
assembling ColorPro plotters. The Bt. Collins plant, H-P's first 
low volume, high variety JIT/TQC site, is an excellent example of 
the continuous improvement process. The Sunnyvale case 
represents H-P's second competitiveness leap through design-for-
manufacture (DFM) coupled with JIT/TQC. The company's most 
recent successes and future plans build upon the foundation of 
DFM and JIT/TQC. These are represented by economical automated 
CIM systems, such as the 'Joey' line at the San Diego plant. 
H-P 9000 Series 500 JIT/TQC Program 
The Fort Collins Systems Division (FSD) initiated JIT and TQC 
~concepts for their new HP 9000 Series 500 product family, which 
went into production in October 1981. This product is a fully 
integrated engineering workstation that has several thousand 
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possible configurations. Prior to implementation of JIT, the 
manufacturing organization at FSD had a clustered (or functional) 
layout without common flows; they planned and controlled the shop 
using MRP; and had long lead times, moderate inventory levels 
(7.5 turns per year), quality problems, and high manufacturing 
costs. 
The divis'ion's manufacturing objectives for the Series 500 
''were to· maximize product and process quality, maximize 
asset utilization, maximize manufacturing flexibility, and 
minimize product cost. It was decided.that the best 
strategy was to apply MRP and JIT to the HP 9000 product line - despite the fact .. that it was a complex low volume product [ 42] • '' , 
The production sequence for the HP 9000 at FSD is: printed 
circuit board (PCB) assembly and test, module assembly and test; 
and final assembly, test, and packaging of the computer system. 
' 
After studying the fundamental characteristics of repetitive 
assembly lines, FSD management decided that connected flow 
assembly line production would not be appropriate for the high 
variety, low volume HP 9000. Batch production was also not 
. 
acceptable. They chose to implement a clustered flow line with 
Kanban control and a make-to-order inventory policy. This refers 
to a 'pull system' where ne~ customer orders signal production of 
new systems, which in turn signal assembly of new modules .and 
PCBs. This is one of the first Kanban control systems used in a 
low volume application with a clustered layout. 
42 I th ' ' ' • JIT TQC: Pa ways to Competitive Manufacturing; p.2. 
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The JIT i~plementation process at the FSD was in four phases over 
a four year period. The initial phase (experiment) involved 
setting up a 'pull system' using Kanban cards; and redesigning 
the shop-floor layout, assembly equipment, information systems, 
and process controls for the final assembly and test department. 
The scope of the experiment was small, but all functional groups 
were active participants. As manufacturing personnel and 
engineers reduced the size and complexity of the production line; 
the purchasing group was improving supplier service through 
reducing the supplier base and improving communications and 
support for the remaining vendors; the materials and computer 
people were converting ·trom an MRP-based factory order shop floor 
control system to a greatly simplified 'visual control' of the 
streamlined process based on daily assembly rates; and the 
accountants were developing new measurement systems suited for 
JIT operation. 
Subsequent phases converted the JIT experiment in workstation 
assembly to an entire JIT factory. The second phase converted 
the PCB and module assembly to separate 'pull systems'. H-P 
refers to these separate departmental JIT operations as the 
• 
'short pull'. The workstation assembly and test department was 
continuing to refine its operation while the JIT system in PCB 
assembly was starting up. In the th\rd phase, the separate JIT 
operations were combined into a continuous process, or the 'long 
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pull' system, despite the clustered layout. The success of this 
phase was aided by the development of an "electronic Kanban 
system" which linked the entire plant from the receiving docks to 
the final system packaging. The fourth and most recent phase 
broadened the project scope from manufacturing operations to the 
entire 'value chain'. Marketing, R&D, manufacturing, and 
distribution.links were improved to develope greater synergy of 
the entire organization. These links include: a design-for-
manufacturing (DFM) program, developing CAD/CAM links, and 
coordinating shipments so all arrive at the customer within a few 
j 
days. The implementation process also required many 
organizational and personnel administration changes and extensive 
training programs. Much of FSD's JIT and TQC success has been 
attributed to their employee training activities. Not only did 
all employees involved in manufacturing and its support receive 
extensive JIT and TQC training, but hundreds of workers whose 
jobs were eliminated by productivity improvements were retrained 
to fill administrative support and technician positions. 
During the four phased implementation plan FSD achieved the 
following results: 
* Increased total people productivity by greater than 30%. 
* Reduced WIP by greater than 60%. 
. . 
. 
* Improved inventory turnover rate from 7.5 to 45.6 times per year. 
• 
* Reduced thru-put time through the entire factory from greater than 25 days to less than 6 days. 
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* Reduced customer lead times from an average of 12 weeks to less than 4 weeks. 
* Improved product <fuality by a factor of 4 X. 
H-P was able to accomplish this transition to TQC and JIT more 
rapidly and effectively than other firms because, according to 
Schonburger, ''H-P had a head start, since the problem-solvers 
were already in the right place: next to where the production 
problems occur ( 43]. '' 
HP 150 and Vectra - Design-For-Manufacturing 
The Hewlett-Packard Personal Office Computer Division in 
Sunnyvale, CA manufactures products for the highly competitive 
personal computer market. They compete with products that have a 
tremendous volume advantage such as the IBM Personal Computer 
li~e, and the Apple II and Macintosh computers. H-P's small 
production volumes and short product life cycles limit the use of 
factory automation as a means to reduce cost-and improve product 
quality. They also have continued to manufacture their products 
in the U.S. with a large labor cost disadvantage versus their 
many Pacific Rim competitors. Yet, in spite of these 
disadvantages, H-P has one of a1:z_ew low-volume American-made 
43. World Class Manufacturing; p. 40. 
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personal computer product lines which have been profitable. 
Their success is largely attributed to the efficiency of the 
manufacturing plant in Sunnyvale. 
The Sunnyvale plant has been able to produce personal computers 
economically because of their excellent product and process 
.. 
design and their success at minimizing all non-value-added costs. 
This plant assembles computers from PCBs and monitors produced at 
other H-P plants and components purchased from hundreds of 
suppliers. 
In 1983 H-P introduced the H-P 150 Personal Computer; it replaced 
the unsuccessful H-P 120 and 19 other desktop computer products. 
These earlier models could not compete effectively in the booming 
personal computer market of the early 1980's because of their 
high manufacturing cost. The H-P 150 was planned to be 
competitive in small volumes for this market experiencing rapid 
e I price erosion. 
The H-P 150 assembly process was designed for JIT production. 
The entire operation required just 7500 square feet of plant, 
whereas the previous products required 30,000. The number of 
suppliers was cut from 2000 to 200. Lead times, lot sizes and 
inventory levels were cut drastically, and productivity and 
quality levels increased greatly. Much of this success was the 
result of a vastly simplified product design. The H-P. 150 
( 
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product line had only 450 part numbers; the previous lines 
required 20,000. 
The successor to the 150, the Vectra, was introduced at the end 
of 1985. It is a more economical and higher quality product than 
the 150 because it was designed for manufacturability (DFM). 
This DFM consists of four elements: simplicity, modularity, 
commonality, and pre-automation. 
Simplicity refers to keeping the level of design complexity to a 
minimum. This reduces fabrication and assembly costs and 
potential quality problems. The number of part numbers for the 
Vectra was reduced to 150, and the new product required only 30 
suppliers. WIP inventory was reduced to just one day's worth. 
The modular design of the Vectra gave the flexibility to offer. a 
large variety of product variations with a small number of 
components and assemblies. 
The c·ommonality of components with other products assured the 
cost advantages of high-volume production even for a new low-
volume product. Instead of the traditional approach of selecting 
components which meet ideal design specifications, H-P's 
engineers designed the product around standard, highly reliable 
components through collaboration with their suppliers. 
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H-P's pre-automation program refers to their design of the 
product and process for automation - even if initial production 
is not automated. This is very valuable for new designs with an 
. .,,,..:--
' -'( 
uncertain eventual production volume because: 1) Products which 
can be efficiently made by flexible automation such as robots are 
easily produced by humans. H-P found that this design-for-
automation often results in products so easily produced by people 
that robots will never become economical. 2) If product volumes 
reach the level where automation is economical, conversion from 
manual production can be done quickly and without major design 
changes and extra costs. 
H-P followed similar approaches at their Computer Systems 
Division in Cupertino, CA, which builds HP 3000 minicomputers. 
They achieved great design-for-manufacturability improvements on 
each of their successive new products: the Model 3000/68, 
3000/930, and 3000/950. The total parts in the systems dropped 
~' 
from 11,800 to 2400 and PCBs were reduced from 28 to 11. This 
simplification, in conjunction with JIT/TQC reduced build time 
from 92 hours to 22 and manufacturing lead time from 7 to 1.5 
days. 
92 
, 
- - -- ' .. , .•..... -..----- ··------··"'- --·-· ·--···--·----··-, ---~ _.,.. __ ----- --------. - ·--
., 
HP ColorPro Plotter - Computer Integrated Manufacturing 
H-Ps San Diego, CA plant produces a variety of commercial 
plotters. At this site is an example of the company's recent 
efforts to build on their success in JIT/TQC and DFM to adopt CIM 
as a means to further increase productivity and quality. This 
careful, phased approach to factory improvement is refereed to by 
H-P as 'Think big but start small'. This approach has resulted 
in very rapid quality and productivity improvement with a minimum 
capital investment. H-P has avoided the large obstacles facing 
other CIM proponents such as GM, who tried to apply CIM to a 
complex, problem-filled product and process. H-P is now selling 
equipment and services to other firms striving to achieve similar 
successes. 
The new Colorpro Plotter 'Joey' line in San Diego produces over 
one million units per year in an area less than 10,000 square 
feet. It is a factory within a factory. The system includes 
assembly, test, materials handling, packaging, and information 
processing and control. The flexible assembly system produces 
over 30 different configurations in lots as low a one unit 
without a significant cost penalty. The plant has achieved an 
inventory turnover of greater than 60 per year. Direct labor 
costs are less than one percent of product cost. This state-of-
the-art yet economical system is now one of many showpieces of H-' 
P's ability as a CIM systems vendor. ''We don't claim to have a 
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$250 million CIM showcase like IBM's Lexington, KY (electronic 
·typewriter and printer) factory. Our customers feel a lot more 
,,q. 
comfortable when they go to San Diego and see results for less 
than $1 million [ 44]. '' 
COMMENTARY 
The path that H-P chose to attain 'World Class Manufacturing' was 
much different than the other firms studied. General Electric, 
General Motors, and Allen-Bradley all sought rapid improvement 
through a single technology leap: simultaneously renovating 
factories, redesigning processes, and investing heavily in state-
of-the-art technology. Hewlett-Packard, on the other hand, 
strives for continuous incremental improvement without large ~ 
capital investments. This approach is best represented by their 
slogan ''Think big but start small''. H-P first simplified their 
operations by eliminating waste of all types. Next, they 
designed their new products and systems to further simplify 
manufacturability and be ready for automation. Now, with the 
groundwork set, H-P is aggressively yet wisely developing 
automated CIM systems to further reduce cost and improve quality 
and customer service. This approach greatly reduces the risk to 
44. Electronic Business, May 15, 1987; P.• 61. · 
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the company of large unprofitable investment. H-P's operations 
are mor~ able to respond to changing market conditions because of 
their manufacturing strategy. They can be more aggressive in 
. 
meeting changing customer needs and responding to competitors 
actions with their flexible, efficient plants . 
• 
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III. PR-INCIPLES OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE APPLIED 
This section considers opportunities to apply the concept of 
manufacturing as a source of competitive·advantage to two cases 
at AMP Incorporated. The principle underlying this concept is 
strategic manufacturing planning, which seeks to identify the 
customer needs that the manufacturing function can satisfy as a 
source of competitive advantage. These sources of competitive 
advantage include: superior product quality, superior customer 
service, product responsiveness, volume flexibility, and lower 
product or service cost. 
This study analyzes the competitive environment in these two 
cases. It considers business strategies reiated to the 
manufacturing function which can offer potential competitive 
advantages; it reports the results of actions to-date; and it 
recommends a course of action to obtain competitive advantage 
through manufacturing innovation. 
The two specific cases are the Hand Tool Systems Program in 
Automachine Systems Group and the printed circuit b9ard mounted 
right angle Amplimite Subminiature D connector family, produced 
by the Interconnection Components Division. 
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AMP INCORPORATED 
AMP Incorporated is the leading manufacturer of electrical and 
electronic interconnection devices in the world. AMP is 
headquartered in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, it has 21,800 
employees in the U.S. and 2·5 other countries. Over 100, ooo types 
and sizes of terminal~, splices, connectors, cable and panel 
' 
" 
assemblies, switches, touch-screen systems and related 
application tooling - are supplied to over 30,000 electrical and 
electronic equipment manufacturers. 
AMP's sales in 1987 exceeded $2.3 billion; its net income was 
$164 million. The company's sales growth rate over the last 30 
I 
years exceeds 15% annually. AMP is more than twice the size of 
its leading competitor, its worldwide market share is estimated 
at over 20%. 
AMP's success is largely attributed to their ability to develop 
innovative interconnection products which meet the rapidly 
changing market requirements. These products are of superior 
quality and generally command a premium price. In addition to 
connector manufacturing, AMP is by far the leading producer of 
connector and terminal application tooling. This tooling ranges 
from hand tools to computer-controlled automated assembly 
machines. 
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The primary manufacturing processes employed at AMP are: high-
speed metal stamping, gold and tin plating, plastic injection 
molding and extrusion, and connector assembly. The majority of 
these processes are highly automated and produce a high volume of 
products. 
CASE # 1 RIGHT-ANGLE BOARDMOUNTED AMPLIMITE CONNECTORS 
The Subminiature D family are the most popular data input/output 
(I/0) connectors in the world. Tney are primarily used in 
computers which transmit data through the RS232 standard. There 
are many variations of these interconnection devices. AMP's 
Subminiature D product, known as Amplimite, has both commercial 
and military specification connectors. Figure 5 shows a variety 
of Amplimite connectors. They can be either (printed circuit) 
board mounted or cable/wire mounted. The Amplimite line offers 
both right-angle and straight posted contacts. Some of the 
devices contain filters to limit electromagnetic emissions. The 
Amplimite connectors also come in a wide range of sizes and 
configurations. The specific connector family to be studied is 
the right-angle board mounted commercial Amplimite line. 
The commercial Amplimite connector family has been produced since 
the early 1970's. Volume was quite small until the rapid growth 
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Figure 5 reprinted from AMPLIMITE PRODUCT CATALOG by AMP Incorporated 
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of microcomputers in the early 1980's. Since that time, the 
Amplimite· connector family has grown to be one of the company's 
largest and most profitable products. AMP achieved this success 
by having their connectors specified as the standard by most 
major computer ma·nufacturers. Production volumes have grown five 
fold over the last seven years and have reached the tens of 
millions annually. The rapid sales growth in Subminiature D 
connectors brought on intense competition which resulted in 
severe price erosion. The challenge for AMP has been to continue 
" to improve these connectors, maintaining their quality and 
service leadership, while reducing costs - to maintain 
profitability in the face of the competition and price erosion. 
The primary commercial right-angle Amplimite connector during the 
early 1980's was known as the HDP-20 or Rear Load. The Rear Load 
product is available as a plug (male) or receptacle (female) • in 
five shell sizes ranging from nine to 50 contacts. The contacts 
have .109 inch spacing. Adqitionally, the product comes in three 
lengths, with metal or plastic shells, with two plating options, 
and many mounting hardware configurations. In spite of the large 
total Rear Load connector production, the volume of the hundreds 
of individual part numbers remains quite small. 
In 1982, AMP introduced a new connector known as the Front Load, 
which al.so carries the HDP-20 designation. The Front Load was 
introduced as a lower cost alternative with comparable 
100 
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..... performance to the Rear Load. It is available in the same sizes, 
I 
t 
contact spacing, and with the same plating and hardware options 
as the Rear Load. The Front Load did not gain wide acceptance by 
the computer manufacturers until 1985, when the electronics 
industry was in a major recession. This accelerated the price 
erosion as connector manufacturers tried to maintain production 
volume. In 1986 production vol~me of the Front Load connector 
first exceeded the Rear Load. The Front Load is expected to 
eventually replace all right-angle Rear Load connectors. 
The most recent right-angle commercial Amplimite connector, known 
as HD-22, began production in 1986. This product is based on the 
popular military connector w\th the same name. It was designed 
/ 
to offer more contacts in the same size connector than the HD-20. 
The HD-22 offers more than 50% higher density than the HD-20 by 
using a .090 inch (vs .. 109 inch) contact spacing in the same 
shell sizes. The HD-22, when all configurations are introduced, 
will range from 15 to 78 contact positions. The HD-22 also 
offers product enhancements such as a further design 
simplification and compatibility with high-temperature reflow 
soldering processes. The HD-22 is viewed as a high-density 
application specific alternative to the Front Load rather than a 
product repla~ement. 
The Amplimite connectors tod~y are far and away the le~ding 
Subminiature D connectors in the world. AMP's market share is 
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probably at least six times that of their leading competitors. 
The AMP products offer the highest quality connectors with the 
best customer service in this market. AMP's greatest challenge 
is to manufacture these connectors in the U.S. for less cost than 
• their competitors, many of whom manufacture their products in 
Asian countries with much lower labor and overhead costs . 
. 
Future Plans 
This study analyzes the future plans for the right-angle board 
mount Amplimite connectors. The study considers the competitive 
pressures AMP faces to meet increasingly more demanding customer 
requirements. AMP's customers are demanding high quality 
connectors which are dimensionally precise to facilitate robotic 
insertion. Also, there is increasing demand for just-in-time 
delivery of connectors to their·computer assembly lines. 
Finally, the continued strong competition and decreasing prices 
of microcomputers will assure further connector price erosion. 
\ 
AMP must be able to supply a greatly increasing volume of high 
quality connectors, with shortened lead times, at diminishing 
,prices - and maintain or increase market share and profits. The 
study considers the -product and process alternatives available to 
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AMP to attain competitive advantage through manufac~uring 
innovation. 
The remainder of this study contains details of AMP's future 
product and process strategies. It also summarizes the 
recommendations of how AMP can best use their manufacturing 
operations as a competitive weapon. These sections are company 
confidential. As a result, the remainder of this study appears· 
in a separate report, which is available subject to the approval 
of the author and AMP Incorporated. 
CASE # 2 THE HAND TOOL SYSTEMS PROGRAM 
AMP is the world's leading supplier of applications tooling for 
electrical and electronic interconnection devices. • A maJor 
portion of this business are hand tools which crimp terminals 
onto wires. AMP has been designing and manufacturing these hand 
tools for over 40 years. Although their function is quite 
simple, these tools must be well designed and precisely 
'manufactured tq assure consiste~t performance. Successful tool 
performance is critical to the function of electrical systems in 
• 
commercial, industrial, and military products. 
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t AMP's)hand tools have always offered the highest degree of 
reliability and durability while operating in a rugged industrial 
environment. Hand tools have been designed to meet the 
specifications of each of the hundreds of AMP products which are 
crimped onto a wire. AMP's-application specifications are much 
more stringent than industry standards such as UL (Underwriters 
Laboratory) and CSA (Canadian Standards Administration). The 
demanding AMP application standards apply to all of the companies 
• 
products, whether it be used in an aircraft or a toy. This 
strategy of unique tools for each product and very stringent 
crimping standards contributed greatly to AMP's reputation as the 
leader in product performance. 
However, the large variety of tools, each with unique components 
- implied small production volumes, large inventories of 
components and tools, and limited potential for manufacturing 
automation. This resulted in very high manufacturing costs. It 
also gave many customers much better performance than they were 
willing to pay for. 
The price AMP charges for _hand_tools is often a source of 
contention with many customers, in spite of the fact that these 
prices are often near or below the manufacturing cost of the 
tools. Many competitors in the hand tool market offer products 
at half of AMP's price or less. These competitive products 
generally do not meet the performance levels or durability of 
' 
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AMP's tools. Another criticism of AMP hand tools is that so many 
different tools are often required to crimp a variety of 
terminals. AMP has maintained their leadership position in this 
business based on their quality and service reputation. 
AMP is facing increased competition in·this market primarily 
because of the high price of their products. Many of their 
designs are over 20 years old and do not take advantage of recent 
advances in materials which can reduce cost and improve the ease 
-of operation. For example, most components to these tools are 
machined from cast iron and tool steels. 
hand tools are very demanding on the user. 
Also, many of the AMP 
I Ergonomic 
considerations are now a major concern in applications where the 
tools are used for an extended time and high crimping forces are 
required. These operating conditions can contribute to 
occupational injuries such as carpal-tunnel syndrome. 
Hand Tool Systems 
AMP management recognized the need to improve ,the ease of 
. JI 
operation and reduce the.cost of their hand tools, if they were 
to· remain the leader in this business. They also sought a means 
to reduce the time and cost to develop hand tools for new product 
"· 
applications. In response to these needs, in 1985 AMP's 
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engineers began to design a new family of hand tools which could 
replace 18 existing tool families consisting of 565 unique tools. 
. . 
This became known as the Hand Tool Systems Project. The new tool 
family has since been named the Sof-Touch Tool. The families to 
be replaced represent nearly all the standard hand tools applying 
22 of AMP's most popular terminal and connector product families. 
These tool families account for over 40% of the company's hand 
tool sales. 
The Hand Tool Systems initial product development was completed 
and prototypes were built in 1986. The design has since been 
refined and initial production began in late 1987. The new Sof-
. 
Touch tools consist of three tool sizes based on a common design. 
The small and medium size tools have both open and closed head 
configurations. The large tool will only be offered in the open 
style. Thus, only five hand tool bodies are required to replace 
the 565 present tools. The new tools will have many fewer 
components than the present hand tools. Nearly all the 
components will be made from plastics, powdered metal, investment 
castings, and hardware items. The number of steel components· 
requiring machining will be very small. As a result, the 
material, labor, and overhead costs of the tool components will 
be much less in the new design. 
The die sets wh_ich perform , the crimping are unique to each 
product and will still number in the hundreds. However, the die 
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sets for each size body will have the same overall form. Only 
the crimping inserts will differ. This standardization will 
greatly simplify the manufacture and assembly of the die sets and 
~ 
tools. 
The new tools not only minimize the component count and cost, 
they also are designed to be easily assembled by automated 
systems. When volumes reach a significant level, the 
implementation of automated assembly and packaging will further 
increase productivity and reduce costs. 
The Sof-Touch tools-will be much easier to use than many of the 
hand tools they are replacing, thus the reason for the name. All 
tools will need only a single hand operation and the maximum 
handle pressure will be less than 70 lbs., the recommended limit 
for safe op~ration. 
The tools will also be lighter and more stylish than the all-
steel hand tools. They should also be much easier to service 
than previous designs. The attractive styling will clearly 
differentiate these tools from all others on the market. 
Engineers designing tools for new terminals·and connectors will 
make every effort to use the Sof-Touch bodies and die set 
standards. This will greatly reduce the time and cost of tool 
• 
107 
. .. 
development. It is also likely to result i9 much less expensive 
tools than would otherwise be possible. 
The new tools will not only be a better.and more appealing 
product than those they will replace, the manufacturing cost will 
be much less. Between the simplified design and economies from 
higher production volumes, the average tool cost should easily 
drop in half. In addition, inventory levels will fall 
drastically. ~ 
Competitive Implications 
What competitive impact will be· achieved by a product which is 
less costly, operates more easily and with less repair, and is 
more attractive than its predecessors or its competitors? 
Clearly, opportunity exists to change the market greatly. 
It must suffice in this ·document to report that AMP plans to 
offer much more competitive pricing and to further differentiate· 
these products. The company is also planning to utilize 
extensive manufacturing automation to obtain greater competitive 
• 
advantage.with this product innovation • 
• 
108 
• 
The remainder of this study contains details of AMP's future 
product and process strategies. It analyzes the competitive 
potential of these products based on company business and 
manufacturing plans. The study recommends how AMP can best use 
their manufacturing operations as a competitive weapon. It also 
reviews 0 the problems encountered in the project, the lessons 
learned, and recommends actions to minimize future problems. 
These sections are company confidential. As a result, the 
remainder of this study appears in a separate report, which is 
available subject to the approval of the author and AMP 
Incorporated. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS 
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE FRAMEWORK 
Based upon extensive review of both theoretical concepts and 
actual case studies, a framework for achieving competitive 
advantage through manufacturing innovation is proposed. It is 
applicable to most manufacturing based enterprises, This 
framework is not conclusive, but addresses the key 'drivers of 
success' for the firm to o~tperform its competitors. 
Define the.purpose or 'mission' of the manufacturing 
organization 
Integrate. the manufacturing function into the strategic business plan. Analyze the competition, identify strategic 
opportunities. 
Translate business goals (drivers of success) for response by manufacturing. 
Develop objectives, internal strategies, and action plans to 
achieve the desired competitive advantage. 
Continue to assess the relationship between action plans and the overall business objectives. Adapt the plans to the 
ever-changing market demands. 
RECOMMENDED APPROACHES TO-MANUFACTURING INNOVATION <, 
Beyond the basic framework presented.above, a multitude of 
lessons have been learned by firms that are striving to achieve 
'World-Class Manufacturing' and gain a competitive edge. The 
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following is a summary of recommended approaches based on this 
research: 
Develop strong linkages between the production, 
manufacturing engineering, product design, and marketing 
functions. Strive to eltminate organizational barriers and 
keep the communication channels open. 
Design the product, process, and systems as a single entity. 
Focus all design efforts on meeting the present and 
anticipated future market needs. Design ·for the appropriate level of flexibility. Achieve quality through design 
excellence and process control, not through inspection. 
Simplify the system requirements to their most basic form. 
Strive to eliminate all waste (anything that does not 
di~ectly or indirectly.add value to the product or service). 
Follow the focused manufacturing guidelines. 
Assure that all personnel are adequately trained to perform 
their job with excellence. Build a 'stakeholder 
relationship' with all employees. Involve all affected 
functions when planning 
Push decision making and control 
' 
c 
to the lowest level 
possible. Take advantage of the creative abilities of 
production workers. 
Strive for continuous improvement in all areas. 
Apply advanced manufacturing systems with caution. Be 
careful not to change too many things at once. Be sure that 
the infrastructure is in place to support these systems. 
Develop measurement systems which focus on the success of 
the total organization rather than on departmental or 
functional measures which often result in conflict. 
These findings are presented to support the theories developed in 
Section I. There is ample evidence from actual cases to support 
those propositions. The firm which can develop and execute a 
sound market-focused plan, can gain a strong competitive 
advantage through manufacturing innovation. QFurthermore, recent 
trends suggest that manufacturing is becoming a much greater 
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competitive force in many industries. Firms that are slow to 
react to these trends risk being outperformed by competitors with 
superior manufacturing capabilities. It is imperative for firms 
participating in highly competitive industries, such as those of 
the companies studied, to assess the competitive threats and 
opportunities related to their manufacturing operation. 
\, 
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